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INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have witnessed an explosion in natural
preservation regulation-regulation aimed at preserving the
ecological and aesthetic values of land in its natural or undeveloped
state. There is every reason to think that the scope of such
regulation will continue to grow.
Although efforts to enact natural preservation regulation have
been successful, they have not been entirely uncontroversial. One
of the greatest sources of controversy has been whether owners of
undeveloped land should be compensated when the government
limits or eliminates their developmental prerogatives in the interest
of promoting natural preservation. The "battle lines" on the
question of compensation for regulatory losses are clearly drawn.
By and large, those ideologically and/or financially interested in
promoting economic development over preservation-property
owners, the business community, and intellectual critics of the
modern regulatory state-have favored a generous compensation
requirement.' Those interested in promoting preservation over
economic development-environmentalists and sympathetic
government officials and academics-have been hostile to any
compensation requirement.
2
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1985,J.D.
1988, Harvard University. I greatly benefitted from the comments of the participants
in the Boston University Faculty and Georgetown Law and Economics Workshops.
Special thanks are due to Robert Bone, Ronald Cass, Elizabeth Foote, Michael
Kremer, Stephen Marks, Robert Merges, and Julie Schrager.
See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the Long Beach Island Oceanfront Home-
owners Association and the Coastal Advocate, Inc. at 4, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453) (urging the Supreme Court to
hold that "even if the public interest is served, [developmental] restrictions... clearly
amount to deprivation of private property. If the public interest is to be served, it
should not be subsidized by particular property owners."); Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Northern Virginia Chapter of the National Association of Industrial and Office Parks,
and the Northern Virginia Building Industry Association, Inc., in Support of
Petitioner at 14, Lucas (No. 91-453) (urging the Supreme Court to hold that modern
developmental restrictions motivated by "environmental and other preservationist
concerns" constitute takings for which just compensation must be paid).
2 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the United
States, and the American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of Respondent
at 19, Lucas (No. 91-453) (urging the Supreme Court to reject takings claims
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This Article critically examines the assumption underlying the
affiliation of pro-preservation groups with the strict anti-compensa-
tion position: that the absence of a compensation requirement best
promotes efforts at preservation. The Article questions the
conventional wisdom that "[t]he more often the government must
pay for exercising control over private property, the less control
there will be."
5
The focus of my argument is what I call "the race to develop."
The absence of a compensation requirement encourages property
owners to accelerate development in order to avoid regulatory
losses from future preservation regulation. By reducing or
eliminating this race to develop, a compensation requirement
actually may facilitate preservation efforts. Monetary payments
would remove landowners' incentives to rush to develop and would
thus help ensure that when a societal consensus in support of
preservation of a natural resource has been reached, the resource
is still in existence.
In focusing on the marketplace incentives created by a regime
of uncompensated natural preservation regulation, this Article takes
a different approach from that adopted by most other academic
commentary on the issue of compensation for regulatory losses.
The great bulk of the academic commentary either ignores or thinly
addresses the marketplace incentives created by uncompensated
regulation.' Almost all of the academic commentary, moreover,
whenever the government exercises its police power in a manner that passes muster
under the extremely deferential "rational basis" standard of review); Brief for
American Planning Association and Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 7-8, Lucas (No. 91-453) (urging the Supreme Court to
accept the proposition that until a building permit for a project has been issued, a
land owner has no protected property interest in the development of vacant or bare
land); Brief for Amici Curiae 1000 Friends of Oregon, Oregon Chapter of American
Planning Association, American Planning Association, and National Trust for Historic
Preservation in Support of Respondent at 15, Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994) (No. 93-518) (urging the Supreme Court to demonstrate "deferential respect"
toward legislative decisions to enact regulation without paying compensation).
' Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Nies,
CJ., dissenting).
4 The extensive literature on the Takings Clause falls roughlyinto three categories:
(1) descriptive analyses that purport to find a unifying theme in the case law, see
generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles,
Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (1989); (2)
normative arguments in support of a particular interpretation of the Takings Clause,
see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 331 (1985);Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Takings and the Police Power]; Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
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treats "regulation" as a unified or singular subject of study. The
incentives in particular regulatory regimes and the resulting social
costs warrant far more attention.
5
The academic commentary regarding compensation has focused
on the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and, in particular, the
doctrinal interpretations of that clause set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. Part I of this Article demonstrates that existing
Takings Clause doctrine fails to pose helpful questions. Compensa-
tion for regulatory losses must be justified, if at all, on grounds
other than those squarely addressed in the case law.
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1971) [hereinafter Sax,
Takings, Private Property]; and (3) commentary that explores the contradictions and
tensions in our conceptions of property rather than proposing any singular
descriptive or normative "solution" to the takings puzzle, see e.g., Gary Minda, The
Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings
Problem, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 601 (1991); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of
Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1991).
' Commentators have analyzed the effects of racing behavior in other contexts.
In an excellent article examining the race to establish property rights over previously
unclaimed land that is engendered by a first possession legal regime, David Haddock
suggests that the costs of such a race explain the historical use of "[a]lternatives
superior to first possession," such as the practice whereby "the sovereign claimed title
prior to settlement, then sold or bartered the land to settlers or intermediaries."
David D. Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal Timing. Limiting the Dissipation of
Economic Value, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 775, 791 (1986). Terry Anderson and Peter Hill
have similarly commented:
[E]conomic analysis suggests that rents were dissipated through resource
expenditures under squatting and homesteading and therefore questions
whether disposal of the public domain unambiguously increased national
output. Efforts to give away the public domain created a commons into
which squatters and homesteaders rushed to compete for the rents. In the
process, pioneers paid for the land in terms of foregone wealth, privations,
and hardships, demonstrating that "there ain't no such thing as free land."
Terry L. Anderson & PeterJ. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33J. L. & ECON. 177,
195 (1990) (footnote omitted).
In the patent context, commentators have argued that races to secure patents
result in duplicative research. See e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations,
50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 348 (1968) (noting that "it has not been recognized that
competition between potential innovators to obtain priority rights (and profits) from
innovations can result in premature applications of discoveries"); Partha Dasgupta &
Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELLJ. ECON.
1, 3 (1980) (arguing that "there is some presumption of excessive duplication of R&D
activity in a market economy in the sense that while each firm undertakes less than
the socially optimal level of R&D activity, market equilibrium sustains an unwarranted
number of firms so that industry-wide R&D expenditure is excessive"); Dale T.
Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing and Related Games, 72 AM.
ECON. REv. 968, 968 (1982) (arguing that competition does not necessarily increase
efficiency).
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Part II examines the social costs engendered by a regime of
uncompensated natural preservation regulation. After exploring
and rejecting the argument that a constitutional compensation
requirement is justified by flaws in the political process that
produce natural preservation regulation, the analysis turns to the
race to develop. The race to develop robs society of the time
needed to reach fully informed and fully considered decisions about
the comparative social value of ecological preservation and develop-
ment.
Part III explores possible responses to the socially costly race to
develop. Specifically, Part III evaluates the comparative merits of
four responses-a legislative program of ex post payments for
regulatory losses, a judicially enforced constitutional guarantee of
ex post payments, a legislative program of ex ante payments to the
owners of as-yet undeveloped and unregulated land, and develop-
ment taxes. Each of these responses holds some promise, although
each also presents substantial difficulties. This Article does not
argue that any one of these responses is "best" under all circum-
stances. Rather, the Article sets forth a framework for the com-
mencement of a debate about the race to develop and the means
available to eliminate it.
I. NATURAL PRESERVATION AND TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Three Basic Concepts
The Fifth and, by incorporation, Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without the
payment of just compensation. 6  State constitutions contain
identical or similar prohibitions.
7
The courts have found the application of the Takings Clause to
physical seizures or occupations of private property relatively
unproblematic: where the government permanently seizes or
physically occupies property, it generally must pay.8 Application of
6 The Takings Clause provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was held
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39
(1897).
7 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 9-2, at 588 n.2 (2d
ed. 1988) (providing a list of the states with such constitutional provisions).
s See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) ("In
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the Takings Clause to regulatory restrictions on the use of property,
however, has proved extremely difficult for the American judiciary.'
The doctrinal "test" for what constitutes a taking builds on three
concepts: public harm, reasonable expectations, and diminution in
market value. These concepts form the framework in which the
courts have addressed the constitutional status of uncompensated
natural preservation regulation.
10
general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation."); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,427-
38 (1982) (discussing and rejecting criticism of the rule requiring compensation for
physical takings). For academic analyses and criticism of the sharp doctrinal
distinction between physical and regulatory takings, seeJohnJ. Costonis, Presumptive
and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Modelfor the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465,501-
23 (1983) (criticizing the Supreme Court's failure to adequately explain its special
treatment of physical occupations given its "candid[] acknowledge[ment] that other
impositions may impose far graver economic harm than do permanent physical
occupations"); Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 4, at 162 (arguing that physical
invasions, such as an "influx of ... smoke," should not trigger a compensation
requirement where "competinguses in question (e.g., residential as against industrial)
put inconsistent demands on the other, and both are a priori equal in status").
' Regulatory takings doctrine has been the subject of sharp criticism by legal
commentators and, in pained moments of candor, handwringing by judges
themselves. Justice Stevens, for example, has criticized takings doctrine as "open-
ended and standardless." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting); see also Peterson, supra
note 4, at 1304 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and
conceptual disarray.").
One possible source of guidance for the courts-original historical understand-
ings-has played a minimal role in contemporaryjudicial analysis of regulatory takings
challenges. The drafters of the federal and state constitutions were concerned with
physical appropriations of property by the government. Moreover, even with respect
to physical seizures, the original conception of the reach of the just compensation
clauses was quite narrow. See William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original
Significance of theJust Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,711
(1985) ("Madison seems to have taken a rather limited view of what legal rights [the
Just Compensation Clause] created: He intended the clause to apply only to direct,
physical taking of property by the federal government.").
"o For a critical discussion of judicial reliance on the concepts of harm and
economic loss, see Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1085-100, 1106-11
(1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court's reliance both on a "relatively black-or-white
economic viability test" as "operat[ing] without much regard for economic niceties"
and on the harm element because it "would render the compensation clause a
nullity"). For a critical discussion ofjudicial reliance on the concept of reasonable
expectations, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1371, 1392 (1993) (arguing that
the Supreme Court relies on a reasonable expectations concept that "is drained of all
its explanatory power" because the Justices want to avoid the "more complicated
inquiry" of what set of entitlements "maximize the welfare of the citizen[ry]").
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The essence of the public harm concept is that when the use of
property would cause harm to the public, the government may
restrict that use without payment. No one has a right, it is said, to
use property in a way that injures others. By contrast, when the
public seeks to secure a benefit by restricting the use of property,
compensation must be paid."
The public harm concept does capture some widely shared
intuitions. No one seriously maintains that the government must
compensate the owners of nuclear power plants when it enacts
regulation designed to prevent accidental releases from those plants.
Outside of a relatively narrow set of cases, however, there is likely
to be a lack of consensus as to whether a restricted activity would be
"harmful" to the public. The judicial opinions offer no guidance as
to how to distinguish between public harm and public benefit in
such cases. Conclusory assertions, presumably reflecting the courts'
normative assessments of the activity at issue and its likely societal
effects, are all that are offered.
12
The other two concepts that form the core of modern regulatory
takings analysis-the reasonable expectations of the property holder
and the regulatory diminution in value of the relevant property
interest-sound somewhat less vague than the public harm concept.
In fact, they are equally ill-defined.
The Supreme Court has held that, in determining whether a
newly enacted regulation has effected a taking requiring the
payment of just compensation, courts should consider whether, at
" See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (rejecting a
challenge to a law requiring the closure of a quarry in a residential area); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (rejecting a challenge to an order requiring the
destruction of cedar trees infected with a disease that might have spread to nearby
apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (rejecting a challenge
to a law requiring a brick mill in a residential area to terminate operation); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (rejecting challenge to a law requiring the closure of
breweries).
12 For discussions of the indeterminacy of the harm/benefit distinction, see
Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better
Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 15, 29-34 (1987) (dismissing the harm/benefit concept as
"slippery" and "not ... very useful"); Paul, supra note 4, at 1438-65 (arguing that
courts can scrutinize regulations effectively in terms of the harm/benefit distinction
only if "the governmental aim [is] measured against a reference point that is not
provided by the regulators themselves"); Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 1097-100
("Taken seriously, then, the harm principle would render the Compensation Clause
a nullity. Every state action that passes the legitimate-state-interest test aims at
preventing anticipated harms, and hence no constitutional state action could ever
effect a 'taking.'").
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the time of purchase of a property, the purchaser reasonably
expected that the property would not be subjected to new uncom-
pensated regulation."3 The presence of such a reasonable expecta-
tion strongly weighs in favor of a judicial finding of a regulatory
taking.
Unfortunately, the courts provide very little explanation for their
holdings as to when it is and is not reasonable for a property owner
to expect that she will be subject to uncompensated regulation in
the future. As Jeremy Paul notes, the real question raised by
"reasonable expectations analysis" is whether "a claimant has a
strong normative case to support the expectation."14 The Supreme
Court has failed altogether to make the normative arguments
necessary to explain, for example, its recent holdings that citizens
have absolutely no reasonable expectation of constancy in pension
regulations, whereas they have, at least in some circumstances, a
reasonable expectation of constancy in building regulations. 5
The third concept, diminution in value, concerns the difference
in market value of a property interest before the enactment of a
regulation and its market value afterward. 6 The Supreme Court
has differentiated sharply between cases in which there is a partial
diminution in value and those in which there is a complete
diminution in value. In partial diminution cases, the extent of
diminution is merely one of a number of factors to be considered
in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. By
contrast, where there has been a total diminution in value, a court
is much more likely to find a taking and order the payment of just
compensation.
7
"s See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (noting that if
"expectancies ... [are] sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and
pay for [them] before it takes over the management of the landowner's property");
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that the
"economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations").
" Paul, supra note 4, at 1504 n.284.
15 Compare Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986)
(holding that the pervasive nature of pension regulation undermines any claim of a
reasonable expectation of constancy in pension regulation) with Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987) (concluding that despite the fact
that claimants purchased property with the knowledge that they would need to secure
a permit from state regulators before building, they had a reasonable expectation of
constancy in the requirements for building).
" See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136 (noting the relevance of "the severity of the
impact of the law on [the landowner's] parcel").
" See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95 (1992).
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Whatever its conceptual weaknesses, this special treatment of
total diminutions at least has the virtue of appearing "rule-like." In
practice, however, the total diminution "rule" accommodates sub-
stantial judicial discretion."8 First, the total diminution test, taken
literally, would be meaningless. Even an absolute quarantine of a
land parcel whereby everyone, including the owner, is barred entry
does not permanently destroy all market value because there is al-
ways the prospect that the regulation will be lifted. Because "total
diminution" cannot really mean what it says, it necessarily means
"far too much diminution." The judge's assessment of what is "far
too much" invariably brings into issue her assessment of the con-
duct being restricted and the social need animating the restriction.
Second, the very idea of diminution of value requires a
preregulation delineation of the property interest that is reduced in
value by the regulation. An expansive definition of the relevant
preregulation property interest enables a court to find that
significant market value remains after the enactment of the
regulation; a narrow definition of the relevant preregulation
property interest, by contrast, enables a court to find that all or
almost all value has been destroyed. 19
The Court stated:
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed
belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
Id. at 2895; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The
application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance ... denies an owner economically viable use of his land." (citations
omitted)).
1" For scholarly criticisms of the doctrinal distinction between partial and total
takings from very different perspectives, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and
Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 16-17 (criticizing the distinction as conceptually
unsound and arguing that compensation generally should be required for both partial
and total diminutions in value); MargaretJ. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78, 1684
(1988) (criticizing the distinction as conceptually unsound and arguing that compensa-
tion even for total diminutions often is unwarranted).
19 For example, a court predisposed to find a taking plausibly could define the
relevant property interest as the land area subject to the regulation at issue. Thus,
in a case involving a municipal prohibition on the development of a 10-acre section
of a 40-acre farm, a court plausibly could find that there had been a total diminution
in value of the 10 acres. See e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
153, 154, 160 n.9 (1990) (identifying the relevant property interest for takings
purposes to be the 12.5-acre portion of a larger land holding for which a dredge and
fill permit had been sought and denied). Conversely, a court predisposed not to find
a taking plausibly could define the relevant property interest as the 40-acre farm and,
THE RACE TO DEVELOP
B. The Basic Concepts Applied to Natural Preservation
Applying these basic concepts, the courts have set forth two
distinct conceptions of natural preservation and the Takings Clause.
The first conception supports the constitutionality of virtually any
uncompensated natural preservation regulation on the ground that
the destruction of nature is a public harm. The second conception
supports a requirement of compensation for that subset of natural
preservation regulation that results in a total diminution in market
value. Neither conception is appealing. The conceptions turn on
unanswered and very likely unanswerable questions: (1) when is an
activity harmful rather than beneficial? and (2) when has there been
a total rather than a partial diminution in value?
The leading case articulating the first conception is just v.
Marinette County.2" Just involved a challenge to a county ordinance
restricting the filling of wetlands located within one thousand feet
of a lake. In rejecting the claim that the filling prohibition effected
a taking, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon the public's
unusually strong and historic interest in navigable lakes and streams
and the importance of bordering wetlands for preventing the
pollution of such waters.21 The opinion, however, suggests a
broader principle-that the despoliation of nature harms society and
is hence subject to uncompensated regulatory control:
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can
change its nature to suit any of his purposes? ... An owner of
land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which
even more expansively, all holdings of the claimant in the municipality. See e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (N.Y. 1977) (identifying
the relevant property interest to be all parcels held by Penn Central in the general
vicinity of the Penn Central train terminal), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
There is arguably a definitional problem that is even more fundamental than the
problem of choosing the market valuation that will serve as the baseline forjudging
the extent of regulatory diminution in value. In assessing the preregulation value of
a property in a takings case, a fundamental question should be whether the market
value reflected an unreasonable expectation on the part of the market that the state
would not redefine property rights without compensation. If the market indulges
such an unreasonable expectation, the preregulation market value logically should not
serve as the baseline, but rather should be reduced by the increment attributable to
that unreasonable marketplace expectation. Hence, the reasonable expectations and
diminution in value inquiries merge, and, as we have seen, the courts have failed to
provide guidance as to when it is reasonable or unreasonable to expect protection
against future uncompensated regulation.
20 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
21 See id. at 768-69.
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it was unsuited in its natural state .... [W]e think it is not an
unreasonable exercise of [the police] power to prevent harm to
public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural
uses.
22
The Supreme Court's opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis2' expresses a similar attitude toward uncompensated
environmental regulation. In Keystone, Justice Stevens contended
that where a regulation is designed to combat "a significant threat
to the common welfare," such as the degradation of surface waters,
the regulation falls within the public harm exception to the Takings
Clause.24  However, Justice Stevens-like the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Just-failed to explain why the preservation of resources
such as wetlands and surface waters could not as easily be conceptu-
alized as a public benefit.
Implicitly rejecting Just and Keystone, Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council25 sets forth a very
different conception of preservation regulation-a conception in
which natural preservation regulation secures a benefit for the
public for which the public generally should be required to pay, at
least where there has been a total diminution in market value.
26
Lucas concerned the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act,
which prohibited new construction on certain areas of the South
Carolina coastline. 27 The stated purpose of the legislation was to
2 Id. at 768.
23 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
24 Id. at 485.
25 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
216 See id. at 2894-95. Prior to Lucas, the Supreme Court opinion that most clearly
articulated this view was Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In San Diego Gas & Elec., Justice Brennan
argued that an "open space" zoning designation enacted by the City of San Diego ef-
fected a taking for which just compensation must be paid. See San Diego Gas &Elec.,
450 U.S. at 652-53 (Brennan,J., dissenting). ThreeJustices concurred in the dissent
andJustice Rehnquist, although concurring with the majority on procedural grounds,
expressed his substantive agreement with Brennan's analysis. See id. at 633-34.
Several decisions by lower federal courts and state courts have adopted
essentially the same stance as the Lucas plurality toward uncompensated natural
preservation regulation. The most well-known of these cases involve the same natural
resource that was at issue inJust-wetlands. See e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United
States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (asserting
without explanation that, whereas much environmental regulation frustrates property
owners in "doing harm," restrictions on the filling of wetlands require the property
owner "to maintain at its own expense a facility, the wetlands, which by presently
received wisdom operates for the public good, and benefits a large population who
make no contribution to the expense of maintaining such facility").
2 See 1988 S.C. Acts 634 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-Op.
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protect the beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina,
which the legislature described as "critically eroding." 8 That
system, the legislature found on the basis of an expert commission's
report, has "extremely important" functions, including protection
of life and property from storm damage and gradual erosion and
the provision of "habitat for numerous species of plants and
animals, several of which are threatened or endangered."29
David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots for $975,000 in
1986.30 After passage of the South Carolina Beachfront Manage-
ment Act in 1988, he sued the State, claiming that the Act's building
prohibition had deprived him of all economically viable use of his
land and that he was entitled to $1.2 million in just compensa-
tion."1 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive interpre-
tation of public harm in Keystone, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held there had been no taking.12 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the case.
Scalia's analysis in the Lucas plurality opinion seems to depend
on the view that natural preservation regulation represents an ef-
fort to secure a public benefit, rather than a response to a public
harm.33 His treatment of the harm/benefit distinction, like that
of other Justices in other takings decisions, is wholly unenlight-
ening.
At one point in the opinion, Scalia explicitly rejected the harm/
benefit distinction altogether, arguing that there is no meaningful
way to distinguish between a public harm and a public benefit.
According to Scalia, because a harm-preventing "justification can be
formulated in practically every case," a public harm exception to the
Takings Clause eliminates the requirement of just compensation
except where "the legislature has a stupid staff." 4
Although Scalia rejected the harm/benefit distinction as
completely malleable and hence useless, he proceeded to base his
opinion on that distinction. According to Scalia:
Supp. 1993)).
28 Id.
29 Id.; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2905-06 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (discussing the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management appointed by the South Carolina
Coastal Council "to investigate beach erosion and propose possible solutions").
30 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
SI See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
32 See id. at 901.
33 See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894-95.
" Id. at 2898 n.12.
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[A]ffirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact
that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by
requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state-carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.
s5
The parentheticals following this explanation suggest that Scalia
equated ecologically-oriented natural preservation with "public
service" or public benefit, and more traditional human health and
safety concerns with genuine public harm. 6 In addition to failing
to point to any evidence that developmental restrictions are
generally enacted by means of subterfuge regarding the legislators'
true purposes, Scalia failed to explain why natural preservation
should be treated as a benefit rather than a harm.3
7
5 Id. at 2894-95; see also id. at 2901 (noting that the judicial review of a takings
claim should "ordinarily entail... analysis of... the degree of harm to public lands
and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed
activities" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-827, 827(e), 827 cmt. g,
830-31 (1978))).
LikeJustice Brennan in San Diego Gas &Elec.,Justice Scalia also emphasized that
natural preservation sometimes has been achieved by means of formal condemnation.
See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895. That fact, however, does not justif i the holding in
Lucas. Many regulatory ends could be achieved by the government through formal
condemnation and acquisition; the existence of that possibility is not normally
regarded as the basis for finding a regulatory taking. Moreover, the fact that
preservation once was achieved through compensated condemnation and is now more
frequently achieved through uncompensated regulation does not establish that the
latter approach is unconstitutional. It merely establishes that we are in a period of
change.36 id.
" In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Justice Scalia
suggested a basis for his rejection of the view that developmental restrictions should
be exempt from the just compensation requirement. The California Coastal
Commission had granted a beachfront construction permit to the Nollans on the
condition that they grant the public access across their land. See id. at 828. In his
dissent,Justice Brennan argued that the lateral access condition did not constitute a
taking because, before the Nollans purchased the property, California had expressly
made the right to build on the beach subject to the Coastal Commission's discretion-
ary permitting authority, and the Commission had announced that they would require
lateral access as a condition for all permits. See id. at 857-60. Justice Scalia rejected
Justice Brennan's argument on the ground that "the right to build on one's own
property... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'" Id. at 834
n.2. In doing so, Scalia seemed to recognize a natural or prepolitical right to build
that takes precedence over the positive law of the state. If the right to build is a
"natural right," then it would seem to follow that the state may not deprive a citizen
of that right, even if building in some sense "harms" the general public.
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Scalia also provided little guidance regarding the identification
of "total" diminutions in value. He candidly admitted the fuzziness
of the concept of total diminution: "Regrettably, the rhetorical
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is
greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the
'property interest' against which the loss is to be measured."38
Scalia maintained that this lack of precision was not an issue in
Lucas because "the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found
that the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's beachfront
lots without economic value.""9 Scalia did not provide any substan-
tive defense of that finding, a finding several of the Justices
questioned. As Justice Blackmun noted, the building prohibition
did not prevent Lucas from using the lots for swimming and
camping or from selling the lots to neighbors as a buffer.
40
Although the legal analysis in the Lucas plurality opinion
amounts to little more than undefended conclusions, the facts of the
case do provide a good starting point for reflecting upon the
desirability or undesirability of a regime of uncompensated
preservation regulation. South Carolina adopted its first beachfront
erosion regulations in 1977.41 Between 1977 and 1985, David
Lucas was actively involved in development of the South Carolina
shore as a realtor, contractor, and partner in a 1500-acre coastal
resort known as Wild Dunes.42 When he purchased two beachfront
lots in 1986, there was widespread sentiment that state erosion and
38 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
39 Id.4 See id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, in his dissent in San Diego,
Justice Brennan failed to support his conclusion that the open space designation had
effected a total diminution in value. Brennan treated the relevant property interest
as the 214 acres that San Diego included within its open space plan. See San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 637 (1981). Those acres,
however, were part of a larger 412-acre site that the power company had purchased
in 1966. See id.
A final source of confusion injustice Scalia's opinion is his contention that, if
development of a parcel of land would have qualified as a state common law nuisance
at the time title was acquired, then the state may later enact regulations barring
development without paying compensation. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. AsJustice
Blackmun noted, Justice Scalia, in effect, invites speculation as to how state courts
might have decided hypothetical public nuisance cases at different points in history.
See id. at 2912-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the South
Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977).42 See Brief for Respondent South Carolina Coastal Commission, Lucas (No. 91-
453); Wild Dunes Condominium Project Announced, UPI, Apr. 10, 1984, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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preservation regulation had proved inadequate and required sub-
stantial expansion and strengthening. Indeed, three months prior
to Lucas's purchase of the lots, the governor of South Carolina had
appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on Beachfront Management
and charged it with formulating recommendations for the best
means of preventing continued coastal erosion and preserving the
important environmental and economic values of South Carolina's
coastline.4" Given Lucas's understanding of worsening physical
conditions on the South Carolina coast and of the political situation,
it seems certain that, when he acquired the two lots in 1986, he
understood that there was a sizeable risk that building on them
might be prohibited in the very near future. That he nonetheless
left the lots empty for the following two years may well be attribut-
able to his belief that, in the event a building prohibition was en-
acted, he had a good chance of winning compensation. Had Lucas
perceived himself as operating in a regime in which the unavaila-
bility of compensation for losses resulting from natural preservation
was a certainty, he presumably would have built summer houses on
the lots before the Beachfront Management Act went into effect.
Thus, the facts of the Lucas case suggest that the absence of any
compensation for regulatory losses actually may encourage acceler-
ated development and thereby impede preservation efforts. Part II
of this Article analyzes accelerated development at length.
II. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF UNCOMPENSATED NATURAL
PRESERVATION REGULATION
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the courts have not
provided an adequate account of when compensation should or
should not be paid for losses resulting from natural preservation
regulation. The questions posed by the Keystone and Lucas
courts-whether natural preservation regulation is a public benefit
or a response to a public harm and whether a total or partial
diminution in value has occurred-seem to lead nowhere. Meaning-
ful discussion of the problem of uncompensated natural preserva-
tion apparently must proceed outside the confines of judicial
discourse.
This Part moves from the positive task of describing judicial
treatment of natural preservation regulation to the normative task
43 See SOUTH CAROLINA BLUE RIBBON COMM., REPORT OF SOUTH CAROINA BLUE
RIBBON COMMI-EE ON BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT 1-2 (1987).
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of asking whether such compensation should be required and, if so,
how much. The focus is the comparative social costs of denying or
providing compensation for losses resulting from natural preserva-
tion regulation.
44
At first blush, it may seem odd to think that the social costs
under a compensation regime could be any different than those
under a no-compensation regime. Under either regime, the basic
tradeoff is between the ecological values secured by preservation
and the economic values secured by development. The net cost or
benefit of a preservation decision, one might think, would be
identical whether the cost of preservation is borne wholly by
particular private property owners or wholly by the public.
Compensation rules, in this view, are irrelevant to questions of
social benefit maximization or social cost minimization, although
they may have a great deal of relevance to considerations of
distributive justice.
This Part explores two analyses that suggest that the social costs
of uncompensated natural preservation regulation may be greater
than those of compensated regulation. The first analysis focuses
upon the "demoralization" property owners experience when denied
compensation. Concerns about demoralization do not justify
compensation for losses resulting from natural preservation
regulation.
The second analysis focuses upon investors' reactions to the risk
of future uncompensated regulation. The most troubling aspect of
a regime of uncompensated natural preservation regulation may be
that it encourages investors to accelerate development. The
problem of accelerated development may justify the adoption of a
system of ex post or ex ante monetary payments to landowners or
development taxes.
A. Property Owner Demoralization and Natural Preservation
As Frank Michelman explained in a seminal article on takings,
a fundamental question posed by the takings problem is why we
should treat risk from regulatory loss differently from other risks
where there is clearly no right to compensation.4 5 The world is,
" The term social cost is used loosely to encompass all forms of social welfare or
utility. Although this approach is utilitarian, it is not meant to dismiss considerations
of distributive justice. An analysis of competing conceptions of distributive justice
and their application to preservation regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.
"' See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
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after all, fraught with risk. When I establish a business, I face a
significant risk of failure from, among other things, market
downturns and unreliable suppliers. If my business fails because of
a market downturn, I do not have any claim against the government
for compensation. Why should I have any claim, then, if the
business fails as a result of new government regulation that sensibly
meets a perceived social need?
Michelman argues that citizens are particularly demoralized by
losses that result from government regulation and that such
demoralization imposes its own cost on society. This cost distin-
guishes the risk of uncompensated regulation from other risks.
According to Michelman, demoralization results from the percep-
tion on the part of the property owner that she is being mistreated
by the majority:
If I am able to mobilize my productive faculties under the general
conditions of uncertainty which prevail in the universe, why should
I be paralyzed by a realization that I am at the mercy of majorities?
There seems to be only one possible way to defend this
behavioral supposition. The defense must begin with an imputa-
tion to human actors of a perception that the force of a majority
is self-determining and purposive, as compared with other loss-
producing forces which seem to be randomly generated. The
argument must then proceed to the effect that even though people
can adjust satisfactorily to random uncertainty... they will remain
on edge when contemplating the possibility of strategically
determined losses. For when the bearing of strategy is evident,
one faces the risk of being systematically imposed upon, which
seems a risk of a very different order from the risk of occasional,
accidental injury.4"
Demoralization, then, arises from the fear that one might be the
subject of systematic persecution by a majority. In invoking
Foundations of :fust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1216-17 (1967)
(examining utilitarian justifications for compensation).46 Id. at 1217. Michelman also argues that demoralization occurs when the
government upsets citizens' crystallized expectations that the government would not
re-define their property rights. See id. at 1239-45. As Richard Epstein has argued,
however, such an expectational approach to the takings problem is inherently circular.
See Epstein, supra note 10, at 1370-72. If the courts announced today that from now
on all property rights are subject to redefinition by the government for any cause and
without compensation, no one henceforth could acquire property with the
expectation of constitutional protection against uncompensated regulation. See id. at
1371-72. Reducing the takings clause to a question of actual notice trivializes it out
of existence. See id.
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concerns about systematic mistreatment, Michelman seems to
suggest that takings jurisprudence should be collapsed into post-
Lochner equal protection jurisprudence." In the post-Lochner era,
equal protection analysis has been concerned principally with the
risk that certain groups are subject to systematic mistreatment by
the government. Groups such as African-Americans and women are
presumed to be at greater risk of systematic mistreatment because
of historical prejudice and other identifiable sources of disadvan-
tage. Citizens who do not fall into suspect categories are presumed
to receive fair treatment by the legislature, at least on balance."
If the essence of demoralization costs is the fear of systematic
expropriation, then the concept has quite limited application. Most
of the individuals and business entities seeking Takings Clause
compensation are not particularly likely to be subject to systematic
burdening by the majority. To have much meaning, the demoraliza-
tion cost concept must refer to a psychological reaction that may
occur even when the imposition of uncompensated losses is a one-
time event and not part of a larger pattern.
Of course, one might argue that the majority, acting through the
legislature, demoralizes a property owner whenever it reduces the
value of her property without paying compensation. According to
this argument, it is per se demoralizing for a political minority of
property owners to lose out to a political majority of taxpayers who
do not wish to pay compensation. This argument, however, proves
too much. In the post-Lochner era, we proceed on the general
premise that majoritarian redefinitions and adjustments of econom-
47 The so-called Lochner era ofSupreme Courtjurisprudence was characterized by
judicial unwillingness to defer to legislative determinations. In the case for which this
era is named-Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)-the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute prohibiting employers from requiring bakers to work more than
60 hours per week. See id. at 64. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court adopted a much
more deferential posture in reviewing economic regulation. See, e.g., West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law).
48 In United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Supreme
Court suggested that "political processes" can be relied upon to protect the interests
of minorities except in cases involving minorities that are "discrete and insular" and
that suffer from "prejudice." Id., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. For a critique of the
Carolene Products doctrine, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARv. L. REV. 713 (1985) (suggesting that diffuse large groups, rather than discrete
and insular minorities, are most in need of special protection in the political process).
For a thoughtful defense, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene
Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights
Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991) (arguing that the protection of racial "out-
groups" should remain a serious judicial concern).
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ic rights and privileges are presumptively constitutional within quite
broad limits. Rejection of this premise would freeze and ultimately
atrophy the modern regulatory state, a prospect that only a distinct
minority of commentators or citizens would truly welcome.49 It
would seem, therefore, that property owners' subjectively experi-
enced frustration over uncompensated regulation (whatever its
magnitude) should be weighed in a utilitarian calculus only if the
uncompensated regulation results from legislative decision-making
that offends post-Lochner principles of majoritarian legitimacy.
The question then becomes, what decision-making processes
offend those principles of majoritarian legitimacy? One approach
to this question is to distinguish between ostensibly majoritarian
politics in which minority interests are taken seriously and those in
which the majority reflexively and unthinkingly burdens the minor-
41 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873, 873-74 (1987).
Sunstein noted:
In the different answers to the question, what was wrong with the decision
in Lochner?, can be found the various positions on most of the major
constitutional issues of the modern era. The received wisdom is that
Lochner was wrong because it involved judicial activism': an illegitimate
intrusion by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political
branches of government.
Id. A notable dissenter from this view is Richard Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4,
at 5 (advocating a strict prohibition against majoritarian redistribution of wealth).
Justice Stevens suggested thatJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), represented a rejection of the post-Lochner
tradition of judicial deference to the legislature. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328-30
(Stevens,J, dissenting). The City of Tigard conditioned its grant of a building permit
to Florence Dolan on her dedication of a portion of her property for use as
"greenway" space and as a bicycle and pedestrian path. See id. at 2314. In his
majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained that the city had to demonstrate a
"rough proportionality" between the effects of the proposed new land use and the
conditions in the building permit. Id. at 2319-20. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
condemned the rough proportionality requirement as a vehicle for courts to act as
superlegislatures. See id. at 2329. The significance of Dolan, however, remains to be
seen. The majority opinion seems to limit its rough proportionality requirement to
government land use requirements that are specific to a particular parcel of land and
that involve the actual transfer of title to the public. See id. at 2316-17. The majority
opinion, moreover, fails to explain the basis for a rough proportionality requirement.
The majority opinion's pithy but uninstructive "analysis" is that "the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment" is "as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment." Id. at 2320. At a minimum, Dolan has
energized those members of Congress who favor the enactment of "takings"
legislation requiring the payment of compensation to landowners for losses resulting
from government regulation. See 140 CONG. REc. S12,218-19 (daily ed. Aug. 19,
1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (invokingDolan in support of the Senate's passage
of The Private Property Rights Restoration Act).
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ity simply because it has the power to do so. Where minority
interests are not taken seriously and a decision not to compensate
is reached, any resulting demoralization should be a subject of
serious concern.5
In practice, what does taking minority interests seriously mean?
At a minimum, legislators making the decision to regulate without
compensation should recognize and reflect upon the fact that
uncompensated regulation does impose costs on particular citizens
and hence on the society as a whole. Uncompensated regulation is
not costless. Taking minority interests seriously also necessitates
legislative deliberation as to whether any reason exists beyond
political power to assign the costs of regulation to the regulated
entities rather than to the taxpaying public as a whole. It requires,
to use Cass Sunstein's terminology, that decision-making be based
on something more than mere "naked preferences."
5 1
The actual thought processes of legislators, of course, are never
fully known. Therefore, there is a case to be made for proceeding
on the basis of the identification of general scenarios in which
reflexive exercises of majority power are particularly likely to occur.
In such cases, minority property owners may reasonably presume
that a denial of compensation resulted from a failure on the part of
legislators to take their interests seriously.
It seems plausible-if somewhat tautological-to say that a
minority interest is likely to be taken seriously by legislators when
the minority is sufficiently strong to garner the attention of
legislators; the strength of the minority's voice, in other words, is
critical.5 2 Although the strength or weakness of that voice will
o For example, a legislative decision not to compensate a group of farmers for
losses resulting from wetlands regulation could reflect nothing more than the fact
that the taxpaying majority (or the interest group that would lose funding redirected
toward compensation) was politically more powerful than the farmers. Alternatively,
the decision may reflect a recognition that farmers have received and continue to
receive a multitude of offsetting special benefits from the government without charge
and that for a number of years the government has been urging farmers to voluntarily
make the transition out of wetland farming.
" See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689 (1984) (arguing that the most important clauses of the Constitution,
including the Takings Clause, "are united by a common theme and focused on a
single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group
rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw
political power to obtain what they want").
2 To the extent that we posit that the taxpaying majority reflexively opposes
compensation, the strength of the majority voice also is a relevant factor. The
stronger that voice, the greater is the risk it will drown out the minority's voice,
674 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 655
depend on many factors in each case, two factors are likely to be
especially important. First, the wealthier the minority, the likelier
it can and will bear the costs of lobbying the legislature. 3 Second,
the size of the group is important. All other things being equal, an
individual or very small group is less likely to capture the attention
of legislators than a moderately-sized group. Legislators are more
likely to dismiss out of hand one or two letters than fifty or one
hundred letters. A protest march by one individual is less likely to
generate news coverage and legislative inquiry than a march by two
thousand individuals.
5 4
To the extent that one does accept this analysis, one is unlikely
to be troubled by the absence of compensation for losses resulting
from natural preservation regulation. Those most often subjected
to uncompensated natural preservation regulation-groups of
wealthy individuals and businesses-are likely to be taken very
seriously by legislators.55
leading legislators to fail to take the minority interest seriously.
At the federal level, taxpayers are a very large group, each of whom has a rather
small financial interest in the decision of Congress to provide or deny compensation
to any particular property owner. Public choice theory suggests that large groups
with diffuse interests in an outcome rarely will be able to organize effectively. In
smaller jurisdictions with smaller taxpayer populations, a legislative decision to
compensate or not to compensate will have a more substantial impact on individual
taxpayers and, according to public choice theory, taxpayers will be more likely to
organize to oppose compensation. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 130-32 (1992) (distinguishing between
federal and local government action on this basis).
In reality, however, legislators at the local, state, and federal level are very
sensitive to popular opposition to deficit spending (where it is an option at all) and
tax increases. President Clinton's difficulties in securing passage of tax proposals
attest to the perceived strength of taxpayer sentiment. See Edwin Chen & Karen
Tumulty, Foley Sees Little Support for National Sales Tax, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1993, at
A20 (discussing the Clinton administration's sensitivity to Republican success in
public opinion polls concerning economic policy); Ann Devroy & Eric Pianin, White
House Goes on Offensive: Clinton, Aides Defend Mix of Taxes and Cuts in Budget, WASH.
POST, June 22, 1993, at Al (same). At least at present, it seems difficult to say that
the voice of taxpayers is substantially softer at the federal level than at the local level.
"' Even extremely small groups are likely to be taken seriously if they possess
sufficient resources. For example, an uncompensated regulation that would
negatively affect Bill Gates, the multibillionaire founder of Microsoft, almost certainly
would not be enacted without serious consideration of the loss to Gates and the
fairness and prudence of inflicting it upon him.
' For analyses of the disadvantages of small groups and individuals in the
legislative political process, see Farber, supra note 52, at 132-36; William A. Fischel,
Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 865, 887-94 (1991); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, 77 VA. L. REv. 1333, 1355-60 (1991).
s See generally Betsy Carpenter, This Land Is My Land: Environmentalism Is
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Consider, for example, the federal wetlands program that was at
issue in Florida Rock Industries v. United States.56  The federal
wetlands program potentially affects an enormously large number
of landowners; by one estimate, more than three million acres of
land in the State of Louisiana qualify as wetlands under federal
guidelines.57 The federal program's broad sweep encompasses
interest groups that have substantial resources and political power,
including agriculture and the real estate and building industries.
These groups have mounted a fierce and well-organized campaign
to limit wetland regulation or, in the alternative, require compensa-
tion for regulatory losses.
58
There is no question that Congress has listened to, if not
accepted, the voice of those interests that are potentially affected by
wetlands regulation. Bills requiring compensation for wetlands
regulation have been introduced in Congress, and hearings on these
bills have been held at which proponents of compensation have
testified.59 The opponents of compensation in Congress have been
Colliding with the Rights of Property Owners, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 14, 1994,
at 65, 68-69 (reporting that landowners affected by environmental regulation "often
portray themselves as average 'moms and pops,'" but "a look at who owns land in
America reveals that by and large the property rights movement represents the
wealthier and more powerful segments of American society... [and that] most of the
privately owned land in America is concentrated in the hands of relatively wealthy
individuals and corporations"). Of course, some of those adversely affected by
preservation regulation have quite limited means. See, e.g., Robert McClure, Private
Land as Public Policy: Supporters Say Time to Compensate Owners Hurt by Environmental
Laws, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 1994, at 1 (describing the plight of an elderly
woman who spent her life savings on a 10-acre plot and then learned that wetlands
regulations prohibited her from building a retirement home there).
5 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Florida Rock involved a challenge to the Army
Corps of Engineers' denial of a permit to mine limestone that lay beneath a tract of
wetlands. The extraction of the limestone would have destroyed the surface wetlands.
See id. at 1575.
7 See John McQuaid, Owner's Rights Sacred, Bill Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 3, 1994, at B1, B2 (noting that the three million acres of wetlands in
Louisiana constitute 70% of the total wetlands in the continental United States).
's For accounts of this campaign, see, for example, Backers of Major House Property
Rights Bill to Push for Floor Vote, INSIDE EPA, Mar. 18, 1994, at 7 ("The debate over
how to address landowner complaints [about] federal Clean Water Act wetland rules
... is among the most contentious and emotional issue facing Congress."); Ellen
Gamerman, Wetlands Compensation Sparks House Panel Debate, State News Service, May
21,1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (discussing ongoing attempts
to enact wetlands compensation legislation); William G. Laffer, The Private Property
Rights Act: Forcing Federal Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. REP.,
Apr. 3, 1992 (same).
1 See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Clean Water Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Clean Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife to ConsiderS.1114, the WaterPollution Prevention and
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called upon to and have offered carefully reasoned explanations for
their opposition." Legislators are also likely to take seriously the
interests of property owners affected by beachfront management
programs of the sort at issue in Lucas. As Marc Poirier has pointed
out, the owners of beachfront property tend to be very wealthy and
politically sophisticated. Poirier convincingly argues that the
political influence of beachfront property owners is demonstrated
by their repeated success in securing generous state assistance in
times of natural disaster despite the fact that they built or pur-
chased property with specific knowledge of the high risk of such
disaster.61 Of course, the number of property owners affected by
the prospective ban on building in Lucas was relatively small. But
in a state the size of South Carolina, a small group of wealthy
property owners can make their voices heard, and there is every
indication that they did so.
62
I do not mean to claim too much for this line of argument. It
Control Act of 1993, to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Ac4 and Three Other
Acts to Extend and Strengthen EPA Water Pollution Abatement and Control Programs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 556-91 (1993) (testimony of Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Agriculture and Markets Richard T. McGuire); Tauzin Seeks Support
from Heritage Foundation, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2040 (Apr. 1, 1994)
(discussing takings bill introduced in Congress).
' See Representatives Urged to Oppose Measures That Would Require Compensation for
'Takings,' 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2039-40 (Apr. 1, 1994) (describing Rep.
Norman Mineta's "Dear Colleague" letter on this subject); Studds Advises Against
Inclusion of Takings Provision in Water Act Rewrite, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) at A55
(Mar. 23, 1994).
"' See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the
Beach Front, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 260-71 (1993) (discussing factors that enable
beachfront property owners to obtain subsidies from legislatures).
6 One development suggesting the political power of beachfront landowners in
South Carolina is the "startling about face" of a leading democratic legislator on the
issue of beachfront management. Waddell Beats Hasty Retreat on Beach Bill, STATE,
Feb. 23, 1989, at 14A; see also Lisa A. St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands:
Opportunities for a Peaceful Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1991)
(describing clash in South Carolina between environmental lobbyists, representatives
of coastal property owners, and lending institutions and noting that "banks were
particularly adamant" in opposing building restrictions); Folly Beach Residents Say
Beachfront Management Law Dooms Town, STATE, Mar. 15, 1989, at 3E (reporting on
lobbyingby beachfront communities to obtain exemptions from building restrictions);
New Bill Would Allow Unrestricted Development, STATE, Feb. 17, 1989, at 1A (reporting
that Waddell, a Beaufort Democrat, introduced a bill that would reverse many of the
measures of the Beachfront Management Act after coming "under intense heat" from
property owners); Waddell's Proposal Costly, Inefficient, STATE, Mar. 19, 1989, at 2B
(suggesting that Waddell's proposal was explained by the fact that "his campaign
committee consisted of well-heeled landowners, large beachfront developers, [and]
real estate companies and brokers").
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relies on highly contestable normative and empirical propositions
and, to the extent the empirical propositions are true, they are true
only as generalizations. Sometimes political decisions affecting a
large and well-organized minority will have the smell of raw
exercises of political power; sometimes the plight of a single person
will invoke thoughtful legislative deliberation. At a minimum,
however, it does seem clear that there is no general or overarching
reason to suspect that property owner interests are taken less
seriously in the context of natural preservation regulation than in
other contexts. 8
B. Investor Incentives and Natural Preservation Regulation
Demoralization costs are borne by society when property owners
respond to the refusal of government to pay them compensation for
regulatory losses. A very different type of social cost results from
investors' responses to the risk of future uncompensated regulation.
In the natural preservation context, this response is likely to take
the form of an effort to "beat the regulatory clock" by means of
accelerated development. This section first reviews the current
academic literature regarding investors' responses to the risk of
future uncompensated regulation. The section then presents a
model of accelerated development and explores the nature of the
social costs that result from such development.
1. Underinvestment and Overinvestment as a
Response to Regulatory Risk
The academic literature regarding investors' responses to the
risk of future uncompensated regulation counterposes the prospect
of underinvestment in productive activity against the prospect of
overinvestment in activity that might be socially undesirable. As I
explore below, the debate about underinvestment and overinvest-
ment is not particularly helpful in understanding the regime of
6 By contrast, we may want to worry very much about the demoralization that
results from regulatory changes in welfare programs. The populations adversely
affected by such changes, although sizable, may well lack the resources necessary to
ensure their voices are heard. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that post-Lochner deference to the legislature is
appropriate in cases involving "interests that have more than enough power to protect
themselves in the legislative halls," but not in cases involving "a powerless minori-
ty-poor families without breadwinners").
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uncompensated natural preservation regulation because it fails to
capture a central dynamic in that regime-the race to develop.
Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld have provided the most
nuanced argument that compensation may be necessary to prevent
underinvestment in socially productive activity." Their argument,
in essence, relies on three propositions.
First, they posit that some participants in the market for land
are risk-averse.65 Risk-averse investors value risky investments at
a lower value than risk-free investments that have the same expected
value.66 Consider, for example, two otherwise identical properties,
the first of which is guaranteed to produce $1,000,000 income per
year, the second of which has a .7 probability of producing
$2,000,000 income per year and a .3 probability of producing no
income. A risk-neutral investor would prefer the second property
over the first since it has a higher expected value (($2,000,000)(.7)
= $1,400,000). Risk-averse investors, however, might prefer the first
property. In an economy dominated by risk-averse investors, and
in the absence of insurance, one would observe substantial ineffi-
ciencies as a result of underinvestment in risky enterprises.
Second, Blume and Rubinfeld posit that risk aversion normally
generates a demand for risk spreading through insurance and that,
but for failures in the insurance market, we would observe commer-
cially available insurance against regulatory diminutions in property
value. Such insurance does not exist, they believe, because of two
imperfections in the insurance market: "moral hazard," which
occurs when the party to be insured can affect the probability of the
magnitude of the event that triggers payment, and "adverse
selection," which arises because insurers are not always as accurate
as policyholders in assessing the probabilities of the events they are
insuring.
67
"See generally Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984) (providing economic analysis of
compensation as a form of insurance and evaluating efficiency arguments both for
and against compensation); Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 71 (1984) (examining whether compensation
for land taken by eminent domain is efficient).
6 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 64, at 582-92 (presenting several examples
illustrating the relevance of risk-averse behavior to the takings question).
See id. at 592-97.
6 7 See id. The principal "moral hazard" problem Blume and Rubinfeld envision
is that insured property owners would fail to lobby against new regulation and, if they
believe insurance proceeds will overcompensate them, might even bribe public
officials to ensure its passage. See id. at 594. Their adverse selection point is that
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Third, Blume and Rubinfeld propose that ex post compensation
for regulatory losses can serve as a substitute for insurance and
thereby eliminate the underinvestment that otherwise would result
from risk-averse investors' awareness of the existence of the risk of
uncompensated regulatory losses.6" In Blume and Rubinfeld's
view, ex post compensation solves the moral hazard problem that
would beset any scheme for ex ante insurance:
If compensation were paid to landowners after the fact, the
problems of direct insurance would be largely eliminated. First,
properties would not be classified as "insured" or "uninsured,"
removing the possibility that project plans would be altered to take
only uninsured properties. Nor would any bribes be exchanged
for the information that certain landowners are likely to be
harmed by government action, since no insurance would be sold.
Finally, the cost of determining the appropriate tax rate to fund
the compensation scheme would be substantially less than the cost
of determining the appropriate direct insurance premium,
especially given the likely alleviation of the moral hazards involved
in direct government insurance.
69
Whereas Blume and Rubinfeld focus on the social cost of
underinvestment in response to uninsured regulatory risk, Louis
Kaplow focuses on the social cost of oveinvestment in response to
a guarantee of ex post compensation. ° Kaplow's argument also
relies on three propositions.
insurers would be unable to assess the risk of future regulation as well as landowners
and hence would be unable to set premiums at levels that would ensure a profitable
return. See id. at 596; see also William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance,
and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 286 (1988). Fischel and Shapiro noted:
An explanation for lack of private taking insurance... is adverse selection.
A public planner might tip off landowners of an impending taking and
encourage them to apply for insurance in order to reduce political
opposition to his project. Insurance losses would mount as a result, and
private insurers would withdraw.
Id. at 286. It is unclear whether, in fact, moral hazard or adverse selection accounts
for the absence of insurance against regulatory losses. What is clear is that such
insurance has not been and is not currently available, and there are no signs that it
will become available in the future. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509,539 n.84 (1986) (noting that "takings insurance...
is not currently offered").
" See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 64, at 597-99.69 Id. at 599.
" See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509 (1986) (analyzing policy implications of similarities between economic uncertainty
created by changes in government policy and other types of uncertainty).
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First, Kaplow posits that the "efficient level of investment is that
induced when investors bear all real costs and benefits of their deci-
sions."7 He believes, therefore, that "the encouragement resulting
from the assurance that compensation or other protection will be
provided in the event of change results in overinvestment."7 2
Second, Kaplow argues that, as a general matter, the govern-
ment does not intervene to mitigate risks that investors face.
73
Rather, the government, and more generally society, normally
proceeds on the assumption that investors in private markets will
contend with risks confronting them in a socially beneficial way.
This is true even with respect to some risks-like the risk of market
downturns-that are not commercially insurable.
74
Third, Kaplow rejects the notion that there is anything distinc-
tive about government risk thatjustifies departure from this general
practice. 7' Rather, he contends that government intervention to
protect investors against government risk will result in inefficiency
in the form of overinvestment in activities subject to regulatory
risk.76
A simple example will help clarify the debate about underinvest-
ment and overinvestment. Consider the case of a plot of land on
which a chemical company is planning to build a plant for the
production of Compound X. Compound X is not currently
regulated but some scientists and consumer advocates believe it is
dangerous and should be banned. The data regarding its danger-
ousness is disputed and incomplete.
If the company accurately assessed the risk of a ban on Com-
pound X and if it were risk-neutral, it would invest $1,000,000 in the
construction of the plant. If the company were risk-averse, it might
choose to build a smaller plant and invest only $500,000. By
contrast, if the company were assured of full compensation for
regulatory losses, it would invest $1,500,000. The debate between
Blume and Rubinfeld and Kaplow, in essence, boils down to two
questions. Which is worse: a $500,000 underinvestment in the
plant or a $500,000 overinvestment? Which is worse: lost produc-
tive activity due to risk aversion or the removal of any incentive to
71 Id. at 529.
7 Id.
" See id. at 533.
74 See id. at 533-36.
75 See id. at 536.
76 See id. at 551-52.
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take account of the risk that future regulation may alter the range
of permissible activities and hence render (in our example) the
chemical plant totally useless?
In theory, of course, we could imagine a compensation scheme
that is just generous enough to remove the effects of risk aversion
but not so generous as to result in overinvestment. Kaplow has
little faith in our ability in practice to identify that "right" amount
of compensation; Blume and Rubinfeld seem more optimistic and
are sufficiently troubled by the prospect of underinvestment that
they believe a compensation solution is worth pursuing.
2. Accelerated Development as a Response to Regulatory Risk
The starting point for Blume and Rubinfeld and Kaplow is the
recognition that uninsured risk imposes certain costs because risk-
averse investors underinvest. Blume and Rubinfeld believe
compensation may be an appropriate response to this phenomenon;
Kaplow believes that the cure-compensation-may impose greater
social costs than it removes.
The starting point for any analysis of the regime of natural
preservation regulation must be different. The reason is that
investors have available to them an alternative to reducing their
level of investment in response to the risk of future natural
preservation regulation: they can accelerate their investment and,
in essence, beat the regulatory clock. Thus, the question in the
natural preservation context is whether the social costs of accelerat-
ed development outweigh the costs of a compensation regime.
The regime of natural preservation regulation has certain well-
defined characteristics that invite accelerated development on the
part of both risk-neutral and risk-averse investors in response to the
risk of future uncompensated regulation."' First, the potential
scope of preservation regulation is now so broad that the owners of
virtually any undeveloped land in the United States know or should
know that they are subject to some risk of future developmental
controls. As ecological awareness has grown, so too has political
support for preservation of undeveloped land. 8 Ecosystems that
7 Unlike Blume and Rubinfeld's underinvestment phenomenon, the accelerated
development phenomenon does not depend on the prevalence of risk aversion in the
land market. Accelerated development would occur even in an economy populated
solely by risk-neutral investors. The aggregate amount of accelerated development,
however, would be greater in a risk-averse land market than in a risk-neutral market.
78 Of course, the growth in ecological consciousness and regulation is not
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previously were regarded as having minimal social utility, such as
wetlands, are now substantially protected from development.
7 9
The fierce resistance to the Clinton Administration's proposal
for a National Biological Survey reflected a widespread recognition
of a substantial risk of expansive future federal regulation of
undeveloped land. Business and property groups strenuously
opposed the accumulation of more information about the ecological
value of undeveloped land because they believed that such informa-
tion would encourage the powerful trend toward natural preserva-
tion regulation. The survey, they feared, would foster an endless
continuous at all levels of government. At the federal level, for example, there was
arguably a decrease in federal environmental concern during the Reagan Administra-
tion. This temporary decrease in environmental concern, however, was not mirrored
at the state and local level. Widespread criticism of the Reagan Administration's
environmental policies, moreover, led George Bush to style himself the "Environmen-
tal President." See William Schneider, Everybody's an Environmentalist Now, 22 NAT'L
J., 1062, 1062 (1990) ("Republicans are following the lead of President Bush. They
are proclaiming the environmental cause as their own.... Bush now calls himself
'the Environmental President' ... ."). Moreover, even if land investors perceive
environmental regulation as waxing and waning over time, they must worry that their
developmental rights will be restricted during a waxing period.
79 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 951-59, 965-84, 1084-123 (1992) (describing wetlands, endangered
species, and other ecological protection programs); Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use,
Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 629, 629
("Government regulation of land use is becoming increasingly more extensive and
demanding. Growing scientific evidence of the link between environmental quality
and land use and greater appreciation of the ecological value of natural resources
have provided much of the impetus for government's intensified regulatory efforts.").
There are numerous proposals for the dramatic expansion of current natural
preservation efforts. Most notably, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt has
proposed that federal law evolve toward the protection of large-scale ecosystems. See
Babbitt Calls for Ecosystem Management, Cal. Env't Daily (BNA) at 1 (Feb. 18, 1993)
(reporting interior secretary's plan to adopt an ecosystem-based approach to species
conservation); White House to Coordinate Ecosystem Protection, Browner Says, Nat'l Env't
Daily (BNA) at 5 (Mar. 26, 1993) (describing Environmental Protection Agency efforts
to coordinate ecosystem programs with other federal agencies); see also Bruce Babbitt,
The Future Environmental Agenda for the United States, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 513 (1993)
(outlining a broad vision of environmental protection); Christopher A. Cole, Note,
Species Conservation in the United States: The Ultimate Failure of the Endangered Species
Act and Other Land Use Laws, 72 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1992) (discussing proposals for
broader protection of habitats and ecosystems than is currently achieved under the
Endangered Species Act); Elizabeth Pennisi, No Man's Land, GARBAGE, Spring 1994,
at 32, 34 ("Ecologists are realizing that effective conservation entails saving not one
but many species, and doing so in their natural environments. Conservationists
should be taking a broader view that encompasses large-scale preservation of habitats
and ecosystems. . . ."); William H. Schlesinger, Keep the Mojave Landscape Intact, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at B7 (urging protection of the Southern California desert and
other ecosystems).
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stream of federal regulation of private land use."° At the state and
local level, a wide range of ecosystems and more generally "open
space" already have been subjected to special regulatory protec-
tions.8
Second, although the potential scope of ecological preservation
is now vast, its actual progress has been gradual. With respect to
any particular ecological resource, the lag time between the date of
the first serious proposal for preservation regulation and the actual
implementation of such regulation is often many years. At the
legislative level, resource protection bills rarely pass the first several
times they are considered;" determinations by regulators-such as
the decision whether to list a species as endangered under the
Endangered Species Act-also can take years. 3 As a result, land-
" See Wetlands: White House vs. "Wise Use"in Clean WaterDebate?, GREENWIRE,Jan.
27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Grnwre File (describing the "furor" of
property rights supporters against the proposal for a National Biological Survey).
"John M. De Grove, Growth Management and Governance, in UNDERSTANDING
GROWTH MANAGEMENT: CRITICAL ISSUES AND A RESEARCH AGENDA (DavidJ. Brower
et al. eds., 1989) 22, 22-43 [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT]
(examining state growth management initiatives in Vermont, Florida, California,
Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina, Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Georgia,
Maine, Massachusetts, and South Carolina); Elizabeth Deakin, Growth Controls and
Growth Management: A Summay of Empirical Research, in UNDERSTANDING GROWTH
MANAGEMENT, supra, at 3, 3-4 (reviewing and critiquing analyses of growth manage-
ment).
" See e.g., Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1990)
(discussing slow progress of resource protection in Virginia); Bill Dawson, The Ailing
Wetlands: Government's Plan of Action Remains Unclear, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10,
1993, at Al (discussing the fact that "[t]wice Texas governors have killed plans for a
state Coastal Zone Management Plan" and that former Governor Richards was
considering, but had not yet approved, such a plan); NewJersty: Coastal Development
Bill Passes Assembly, GREENWIRE, June 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Grnwre File (describing the "years of gridlock" that preceded passage of coastal zone
legislation); Howard Schneider, SchaeferActs Cautiously on Growth: Governor Sets Aside
Panel's Most Controversial Proposals, WASH. POST,Jan. 27, 1991, at BI (discussing slow
progress of Maryland growth control legislation and regulation).
8 See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 292 n.103 (1993) (dis-
cussing estimate that it will take the federal government until 2006 "to address the
roughly 600 candidate species [currently under review], even if no additional species
are determined to be in need of protection or added to the candidate list"); Efforts to
Save Endangered Species Hurt by Mismanagement, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH,
Oct. 19, 1990, at 13A (noting that, in addition to a "backlog of about 600 species that
probably deserve immediate protection, but have yet to be officially listed as endan-
gered," there are "[a]nother 3,000 plants and animals ... suspected of being
endangered, but [which] 'are receiving little or no protection while they await the
federal review'").
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owners typically have substantial notice of particular legislative or
regulatory proposals that would affect their ability to develop and
exploit their land.
Third, the losses imposed by uncompensated natural preserva-
tion regulation sometimes are very large in absolute terms and in
terms of the overall value of the affected investment. Not surpris-
ingly, the magnitude of the losses incurred by landowners is a
principal focus of those judicial decisions holding that a natural
preservation regulation has effected a taking.
8 4
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the strong norm of non-
retroactivity in the regime of natural preservation regulation means
there is a relatively easy means of protecting oneself against the risk
of a future uncompensated regulation restricting development-
develop immediately and thoroughly. At all levels of government,
natural preservation regulation has been prospective or forward
looking. Newly enacted wetlands regulations, for example, do not
require people who have previously developed wetlands to restore
the land to its natural state; rather, such laws prevent future filling
of wetlands.8 5 Similarly, new endangered species regulations do not
require landowners to restore habitats that already have been
destroyed. Local growth controls do not require existing buildings
to be torn down.
8 6
As a theoretical matter, one could imagine a regulatory regime
in which current and previous landowners are required to take
measures to undo ecological damage that once was lawful. As a
practical matter, such regulation has not been and is not likely to
become part of accepted political debate.
There are several good reasons why this is so. First, the
I See Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 1157 n.306 (noting the prominence of the
"economic viability test" in takings cases involving ecological preservation).
' These laws, however, sometimes require efforts at the restoration of habitats
that were destroyed after the laws went into effect. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(d)
(1994) (authorizing the Army Corps of Engineers to require persons who have
unlawfully filled wetlands to take "corrective measures").
" As Justice Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court has noted, the forced
destruction of existing buildings is generally regarded as outside the purview of the
police power. See Adams Outdoor Advertising v. East Lansing, 483 N.W.2d 38, 51
(1992) (Levin,J., concurring) ("No reasonable person would seriously suggest that the
owner of the Empire State Building could be required, in the exercise of the police
power, to remove the building from the land . .. ."); see also John J. Delaney &
William Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land
Development, 11 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 533 (1980) (analyzing the rights secured
at various stages of a building project).
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prospectivity of natural preservation regulation reflects the
commonsense notion of legislators and regulators that, all things
being equal, the benefit of preventing the future destruction of a
natural resource is likely greater than the benefit of trying to restore
the resource. It is often difficult to recreate nature; wetlands and
other habitats sometimes have been successfully restored, but such
restoration efforts cost much and sometimes fail."7 Some natural
phenomena-old growth forests, for example-are virtually impossi-
ble to recreate. Ecological benefits are much more certain where
the state intervenes before development.
The costs of undoing an existing .development, moreover, are
typically much greater than the costs of preventing development.
Development almost necessarily adds value to the land: labor,
materials, and technology all are invested in building, for example,
a shopping mall on wetlands. There is less waste when the develop-
mental restriction is applied before the mall project has com-
menced. 8
More fundamentally, the strong norm of nonretroactivity in
natural preservation regulation may reflect legislators' and regul-
ators' understandable desire to avoid the difficult task of determin-
ing when human development of a particular resource or area
became excessive. In some sense, all hazardous waste or malaria is
I See Mark C. Rouvalis, Restoration of Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act: An Analytic Synthesis of Statutoiy and Case Law Principles, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 295,319 (1988) ("The restoration process may take twenty to thirty years before
the damaged wetland will closely approximate its formerly undisturbed state. Even
such a lengthy period does not ensure that the wetlands' former plant and animal life
will recover fully. . . ." (footnote omitted)); Past Time to Curtail the Loss of Wetlands:
Mitigation Projects Are No Substitutefor the Real Thing, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at B1O
("[O]nly a handful of the dozens of mitigation projects done so far in Orange County
could be called even promising."); William K. Stevens, Restoring Lost Wetland: It's
Possible but Not Easy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1991, at CI ("[A]ccording to proliferating
studies ... [restoration] efforts are ending in failure."); Wetlands: Restoration Difficulg
Maine Officials Find, GREENWIRE, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Grnwre File (discussing "how hard it can be to replace natural wetlands that are
sacrificed to development").
' The prevention of economic waste often has been cited as a rationale for the
pre-existing use doctrine in zoning; that doctrine limits government's ability to
terminate land uses that were lawful when established but which do not conform to
subsequent zoning ordinances. See Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an
Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1953); see also PA Northwestern Distrib., Inc. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991) ("[One of the] policy consider-
ations [supporting the determination that] amortization and discontinuance of a
lawful pre-existing nonconforming use is per se confiscatory and violative of the
Pennsylvania Constitution [is that] forced destruction will often result in economic
waste.").
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bad: we would prefer to be without it altogether.8 9 The same is
not true, in fact, of human destruction of nature; that destruction
is an essential part of Western living, and most of us accept its
necessity to some extent. Natural preservation regulation is
essentially a societal recognition that the extent of that destruction
has simply gone too far. Ascertaining precisely when development
crosses the "too far" line is extremely difficult. Was it two years ago
or twenty or one hundred years ago that society crossed the line
into having too little ecosystem diversity, too few wetlands, or too
little open space? All in all, it is easier to leave the past alone and
structure preservation regulation in solely prospective terms.
An example will illustrate how these factors combine to
encourage a socially costly race to develop. Consider the hypotheti-
cal case of Land Development Corporation (Land Development).
Land Development owns two hundred acres of forested land near
an urban center in a heavily populated state. The forested area
provides critical habitat to a range of flora and fauna whose
numbers have been decreasing as a result of rapid urbanization.
There is some sentiment among environmentalists and some
community members to preserve forested areas, but so far no one
has taken or specifically proposed political action. Current
environmental and land use regulations do not restrict develop-
ment. Land Development bought the property for $1,000,000 with
the intention of building residential townhome communities on it.
Land Development ideally would like to put off building for four or
five years. In the meantime, income from light forestry on the site
will cover the costs of holding the land in its undeveloped state.
90
Developers and others, of course, often hold land in an
undeveloped state for substantial periods of time.9' In Land
" For this reason perhaps, a norm of extreme or radical retroactivity prevails in
our regime of hazardous waste regulation. Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V
1993), entities may be held liable even to the point of bankruptcy for waste disposal
activities that occurred decades before the statute was enacted. See, e.g., Cadillac
Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 1984) (involving allocation of liability for hazardous waste generated at
an industrial facility that commenced operation during World War II).
'o The existence of a risk of uncompensated preservation regulation would have
precisely the same effects if we assume that the land is held by a nondeveloper (for
example, a timber company) and that developers will purchase land in the area only
for immediate construction. Under those assumptions, the risk of uncompensated
regulation will lead the timber company to accelerate the date on which it sells the
land to the developer.
" For descriptions of this practice, see MAURY SELDIN & RIcHARD H. SWESNIK,
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Development's case, the current market for the sale of townhomes
in urban outskirts is weak; consequently, Land Development does
not believe it could sell townhomes at present for a substantial
profit. The market may well improve in four or five years. Land
Development could build now and hold the townhomes until the
market strengthens. But the building will be financed by debt and
Land Development sensibly wants to minimize the length of the
period in which it must service construction debt. Given the
magnitude of the anticipated debt service, Land Development has
decided it cannot build now and hold the townhomes for later sale.
It must chose between building and selling now (in Year One) or
building and selling in four years (in Year Four).
92
Suppose that Land Development perceives a risk of future
uncompensated regulation prohibiting construction on the forested
area. Let us also suppose for now that Land Development believes
it can ascertain with a fairly high degree of certainty the magnitude
of that risk and that Land Development is a risk-neutral investor.
Under these assumptions, a number of variables would affect
Land Development's decision whether to build now and avoid
future regulation or wait to build. These variables are:
* The value of the townhomes in Year One (Vi)
* The present value of the townhomes in Year Four in the event
the market for housing strengthens (PV4)
* The present value of the townhomes in Year Four in the event
the market for housing remains flat (PV4')
* The perceived probability that the housing market will
improve (P)
* The perceived risk that a regulatory prohibition will be
enacted between Year One and Year Four (R)
* The present value in Year Four of the land after a prohibition
on construction has been enacted (PV4")
As a formal matter, Land Development will build now if V1 >
(1 - R)[(P)(PV4) + (1 - P)(PV4')] + (R)(PV4"). Otherwise, Land
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 165-88 (1987); Gurney Breckenfeld, Higher Taxes
That Promote Development, FORTUNE, Aug. 8, 1983, at 68; Tom Buerkle, Playing the
Securities Niche, INSTrrTUnONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1989, at 115; Seth Lubove, The
Ultimate Inflation Hedge, FORBES, June 21, 1993, at 178; William Meyers, The Great
Land Rush, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1988, at 141; Paul Robbins, White River
Battles the Three Rs, VT. Bus. MAc., Oct. 1987, at 18.
' For the purpose of simplicity, I am assuming that Land Development's choice
is restricted to acting now or waiting four years; intermediate options are not under
consideration.
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Development will delay construction for four years.
Thus, for example, Land Development will respond to regulato-
ry risk by building immediately if V1 is $2,000,000, PV4 is
$3,000,000, PV4' is $2,000,000, PV4" is zero, the probability of an
improved housing market is .5, and the risk that a regulatory
prohibition will be enacted is .7. 9  In the absence of regulatory
risk, the value of the build-in-Year-One option would be $2,000,000
and the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option would be
$2,500,000. When the .7 risk of uncompensated regulation is taken
into account, the value of the build-in-Year-One option is
$2,000,000 and the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option
is $750,000."4 If the risk of regulation were .2, both the build-in-
Year-One and the build-in-Year-Four options would have the value
of $2,000,000 in current dollars.9" Hence, Land Development will
build now, in Year One, as long as the probability of regulation is
.2 or greater.
9 6
s Land Development may be unable to settle upon a precise risk of regulation.
Instead, Land Development may estimate a range or spectrum of possible risks (e.g.,
.7 < R < .3). This is most likely to be the case where Land Development's assessment
of the risk of future uncompensated regulation must be made under conditions of
substantial uncertainty. There are several possible causes of uncertainty: Land
Development may lack effective access to legislators; legislators may be unwilling to
provide an assessment of the probability of uncompensated regulation; and, most
importantly, the legislators may be unable to do so. Many difficult-to-predict factors
affect the legislative and regulatory process, including elections, the personal life
development of politicians, public moods, scientific discoveries, and press coverage.
One source of Land Development's uncertainty about the risk of regulation may
be the developmental decisions of other entities that hold undeveloped land near
Land Development's parcel. Land Development may believe that the political
pressure for regulation will increase as the total acreage of remaining undeveloped
land decreases. Land Development may conclude, therefore, that the longer it
postpones development, the more likely it is that other entities in the area will
develop their land and subject Land Development to a heightened risk of uncompen-
sated developmental controls. In other words, Land Development may perceive the
race to develop as entailing a race among developers.
' When R is .7, the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option is (1 - .7)
[(.5)($2,000,000) + (1 - .5)($3,000,000)] + (.7)(0), which equals $750,000.
" When R is .2, the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option is (1 - .2)
[(.5)($2,000,000) + (1 - .5)($3,000,000)] + (.2)(0), which equals $2,000,000.
' One possible objection to this analysis is that, instead of accelerating devel-
opment, Land Development may decide to reduce the risk of regulation through
investments in the political process. By investments in the political process, I mean
expenditures of money made with the specific purpose of influencing the behavior
of elected and/or unelected government officials. Such expenditures might include,
for example, financial contributions to the campaigns of legislative candidates and the
retention of professional political lobbyists. It is a truism that expenditures of this
sort sometimes influence political outcomes. See, e.g., Blair Kamin, Pro-Growth Forces
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Raise the Stakes for Politicians in Suburban Elections, CI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1991, at 1
(describing developers' large contributions to successful campaigns of pro-growth
candidates for county boards in the suburbs surrounding Chicago).
Figure 1 illustrates the inverse relationship between Land Development's
investment in the political process (1) and the risk of future uncompensated
regulation (R). R'" is the risk of regulation that Land Development must bear when
it makes no investment in the political process.
FIGURE 1
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Whether Land Development invests anything in political efforts and, if so, how
much it invests depends on the position and shape of the curve generated by the
intersection of the I and R variables. If there is no point on the curve depicted in
Figure 1 for which it is true that the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option
minus Land Development's investment in the political process exceeds the value of the
build-in-Year-One option, then Land Development will invest nothing in the political
process and instead accelerate development. If there is more than one point on the
curve at which this condition is satisfied, Land Development will select the investment
level at which the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option minus Land
Development's investment in the political process is maximized. Stated more
formally, Land Development will select the level of investment, I, at which (1 - R)
[(P)(PV4) + (1 - P)(PV4')J + (R)(PV4") - I is maximized.
For example, suppose that Land Development perceives a .3 risk of uncompen-
sated regulation and that, therefore, the value of the build-in-Year-One option
($2,000,000) exceeds the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option ($1,750,000)
by $250,000. Now suppose that Land Development estimates that a $200,000
contribution to legislators' campaign funds will reduce the risk of uncompensated
regulation to .05 and a $450,000 contribution will reduce the risk to .01. If the risk
of regulation were .05, the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option
($2,375,000) would exceed the present value of the build-in-Year-One option
($2,000,000) by $375,000. If the risk of regulation were .01, the present value of the
build-in-Year-Four option ($2,475,000) would exceed the value of the build-in-Year-
One option ($2,000,000) by $475,000. Thus when I= $200,000, Land Development
realizes a net gain of $175,000 ($375,000 - $200,000), and when I= $450,000, Land
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Now let us assume that Land Development is risk-averse. As a
general matter, risk aversion tends to vary inversely with the
investor's wealth and, holding wealth constant, it varies with the
magnitude of the possible losses."7 Some land developers have
relatively limited assets and hence limited capacity to self-insure
through portfolio diversification; as discussed above, insurance
against risks of regulatory loss is not commercially available."8 The
magnitude of potential losses in this example and many actual cases,
moreover, is large. Hence, Land Development may choose the
build-now option even if its best guess as to the probability of
regulation is lower than .2. 9'
Development realizes a net gain of $25,000 ($475,000 - $450,000). Accordingly,
Land Development will contribute $200,000 to campaigns, accept the .05 risk of
future uncompensated regulation, and wait until Year Four to commence building.
This analysis, of course, does not suggest thataccelerated development is an illu-
sory problem. Rather, it suggests that the extent of accelerated development will be
greatest in political jurisdictions where the "cost" of reductions in regulatory risk is
very high or where such reductions simply cannot be purchased. Conversely, relative-
ly little accelerated development will occur injurisdictions in which modest monetary
investments can prevent the enactment of uncompensated preservation regulation.
The progress of environmental regulation at all levels of government indicates
that, in fact, it is often very expensive or impossible to block new regulation through
monetary investments in the political process. Although the opponents of
environmental regulation have consistently invested far greater sums in the political
process than those public interest and citizen groups that support increased
regulation, the scope of regulation has continued to increase.
97 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 54, at 601-02; see also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20J. LEG. STUD. 225, 238-39 (1991) (discussing
some of the implications of the proposition that, for most individuals, wealth has a
declining marginal utility).
" See Kaplow, supra note 67, at 539 n.84; see also Lettice Stuart, Housing the Elderly:
"Assisted Living" Builders Regroup for the 90's, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, § 10, at 3
(discussing "undercapitalization" of many developers in the 1980s).
" In addition to its attitude toward risk, Land Development's beliefs about
patterns in public attitudes may affect its decision whether to build now or in four
years. Land Development may believe that public support for environmental
protection waxes during periods of economic prosperity and wanes during periods
of economic stagnation and recession, when "bread and butter" issues such as jobs
command greater attention. See, e.g., Robert Reinhold, Hard Times Dilute Enthusiasm
For Clean-Air Laws, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1993, at Al ("The worst economic slump
since the Depression has created an audience for the argument that pollution
restrictions are luxuries that Southern California cannot afford .... The economy
is changing priorities."). Accordingly, Land Development may perceive two distinct
risks of future regulation-a higher risk in the event the economy improves and a
lower risk in the event the economy fails to improve. If that is the case, Land
Development may accelerate development even if it perceives an average risk of
regulation that is less than .2.
To illustrate this point, consider two scenarios. In scenarios one and two, Land
Development perceives a .5 probability that the economy will improve and a .5
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Some developers, of course, will be predisposed to act in a risk-
neutral manner with respect to the risk of uncompensated regula-
tion. Even such developers, however, might be compelled to act in
a risk-averse manner in order to satisfy the demands of lending
institutions that are financing their projects. Although lending
institutions engaged in aggressive lending during the real estate
boom of the 1980s, they traditionally have been regarded as fairly
cautious or risk-averse business enterprises; an extensive body of
state and federal bank underwriting regulation is intended to insure
that such institutions place their solvency above profit consider-
ations."' Lending institutions are demonstrably aware of and
concerned about the prospect of losses from uncompensated
preservation regulation. As Bill Fruit, chairman of the American
Bankers Association's Real Estate Executive Committee, explains,
banks "can foreclose and bankrupt developers" whose projects are
blocked by new regulations, but then they "end up with property
nothing can be done with."'01 According to Fruit, the absence of
compensation "for not being able to develop land is probably the
biggest issue lenders and developers are faced with.""0 2
In response to the skittishness of risk-averse lenders regarding
uncompensated regulatory losses, developers may well rush to
secure financing for development projects as soon as possible. For
example, Land Development could perceive the risk of regulatory
loss as .1, but be aware that it will be difficult to convince its fretful
bank that the land is not about to be barred from development.
probability that the economy will remain flat; the value of the development in Year
One is $2,000,000; its present value in an unimproved economy in Year Four is
$2,000,000; and its present value in an improved economy in Year Four is $3,000,000.
In scenario one, Land Development perceives a .18 risk of uncompensated regulation
in both an improved and unimproved economy. In scenario two, Land Development
perceives a .35 risk in an improved economy, a .01 risk in an unimproved economy,
and, accordingly, an average risk of regulation of .18.
Under these assumptions, Land Development will accelerate development only
in scenario two. In scenario one, the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option
is (.5)(.82)($2,000,000) + (.5)(.82)($3,000,000), or $2,050,000. In scenario two, the
present value of the build-in-Year-Four option is (.5)(.99)($2,000,000) + (.5)
(.65)($3,000,000), or $1,965,000. The Year One option is more attractive than the
Year Four option in scenario two, but not in scenario one.
100 See generally 1 ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAw IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 11.1 (2d ed. 1993) ("[M]aintaining bank safety and soundness [is] the pervasive
theme of the banking law of the United States [and is] pursued.., through many
devices.").
"I1 The Regulatoty Compliance Watch, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Mar. 9, 1992, at 2.
102 Id.
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Rather than take the chance that future political events or media
coverage will make the bank completely unwilling to lend or willing
to lend only at an exorbitant interest rate, Land Development may
act quickly to borrow and build in Year One even if, were it fully
self-financing, it would wait until Year Four.
The acceleration of Land Development's building plans imposes
two distinct costs on society. The first is a cost in allocative
efficiency. In our example, the allocatively efficient use of the land
from Year One to Year Four is its use as light forestry operation;
during that period, the capital needed for building would be better
spent elsewhere. The existence of a risk of uncompensated regula-
tion does not cause a commensurate reduction in investment, but
rather a presumptively inefficient channelling of resources into
projects before the time at which they are wealth-maximizing.'
10 Figure 2 illustrates the allocative efficiency cost associated with the race to
develop.
FIGURE 2
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Ti is the time at which the developer will commence building when operating in an
environment characterized by a risk of uncompensated regulation; T2 represents the
time at which the developer will commence building in the absence of such risk. R1
represents the return on an alternative investment to the building project-let us say,
for example, the alternative investment is the renovation of an urban apartment
house. In the absence of the risk of uncompensated regulation, the developer would
prefer the apartment renovation project to the building project between time Ti and
time T2 and would have the capital available to invest in that project during the
Ti-T2 interim period. R2 represents the return on the building project.
The shaded area represents the aliocative efficiency cost that results from the
developer's acceleration of the building project and consequent inability to invest in
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The second cost is simply the loss of the societal option to
decide whether to preserve the land in its natural state. As long as
a strong norm of nonretroactivity obtains in the regime of natural
preservation regulation, the subjects of such regulation will be
limited to undeveloped land. The acceleration of development in
response to the risk of uncompensated natural preservation
regulation reduces the potential subjects of natural preservation
regulation and thereby frustrates any long-term effort to establish
a sustainable balance between human development and natural
preservation.
This characterization of the reduction of potential regulatory
subjects as a social cost is susceptible to a rather obvious charge of
normativity or nonneutrality-a charge I readily admit. The loss of
choice of potential regulatory subjects is only troubling to the extent
that one believes that natural preservation is an important societal
goal, that the societal and hence political appreciation of that goal
is increasing, and that, therefore, the social and political calculus
about the relative importance of the preservation and economic
exploitation of a given site or resource might well shift with the
passage of time.
104
and reap returns from the apartment renovation project during the T-T2 interim
period.
104 This analysis does not account for the possibility that the developer and the
legislature may engage in a dynamic "racing game" wherein the developer's race to
develop engenders a race to regulate on the part of the legislature. Reconceptual-
izing the relationship between developer and legislator as a game, however, does not
alter the conclusion of the analysis. As long as one assumes that the developer
generally will win the racing game-and there are good reasons to think it will-the
bottom line remains the same: the risk of uncompensated regulation imposes a social
cost by eliminating potential subjects of preservation regulation.
To illustrate how a racing game might operate, assume that Land Development
perceives the risk of uncompensated regulation to be .1 and is risk neutral. Under
those assumptions, Land Development will prefer the build-in-Year-Four option over
the build-in-Year-One option since the present value of the Year Four option exceeds
that of the Year One option. Now let us relax the assumption that Land Develop-
ment's choice is solely between Year One and Year Four. In response to the
perceived .1 risk of regulation, Land Development might accelerate its plans
somewhat, choosing to build in Year Three instead of Year Four. If legislators detect
this change in the plans of Land Development, they might focus more attention on
the problem of dwindling forest land. The increased legislative attention may cause
Land Development to perceive a greater risk of regulation and, as a result, to further
accelerate its building plans so that-let us say-building will now be scheduled to
commence in Year Two. If the legislators detect this acceleration, they could begin
the process of drafting developmental controls and, in response, Land Development
could further expedite its building plans. In the end, the game would be won by the
party that made the last move, and there is no way to be sure whether that would be
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Assuming one accepts the proposition that the race to develop
is an undesirable phenomenon, the next question one might ask is
whether the social costs at issue are large enough to warrant serious
concern. Unfortunately, it is impossible to provide a definitive
answer to that question. Developers do not systematically analyze
and announce their motivations for the timing of their decisions.
We simply do not know how much accelerated development has
occurred and may be occurring as a result of the risk of uncompen-
sated regulation.
We do know that observers of and participants in the develop-
ment process believe that development is accelerated in response to
regulatory risk. Developers, when asked, confirm that they weigh
the risk of future developmental controls in planning the timing of
projects. As one lawyer for developers has observed, there exists "a
high-stakes contest between 'growth' and 'no growth' forces, where
the developer seeks to win vested rights to a specific development
plan before the municipality changes the land use rules." 10 5 Land
use lawyers, developers, and interested government officials seem
to agree that uncertainty about future growth controls leads
developers to "engage in speculative land purchases and develop-
ment." 0 6  Anecdotal accounts suggest that the magnitude of
Land Development or the legislature.
It seems likely, however, that developers such as Land Development generally will
win the game. First, effective participation in the game requires an ability to detect
the moves of the other player. Because the legislative decision-making process is
much more open than the decision-making process of private developers, developers
have a substantial advantage over legislators. Second, whereas developers are free to
change their strategy whenever it is profit-maximizing for them to do so, legislators
operate under political constraints. Societal and hence political support in favor of
preservation has increased only gradually over time and, as a result, legislators may
be unable or unwilling to accelerate the regulatory process in response to an obvious
acceleration in development. It takes a great deal of time for environmentally-
concerned citizens and their legislative allies to raise public consciousness and
awareness and forge a political consensus in favor of a preservation program.
Developers, by contrast, can act quickly to advance their interests while at the same
time exercising their political clout in favor of delay in the legislative process.
Moreover, even if the legislature "wins" the game by preventing development,
society may lose. Rushed to regulate before they can gather adequate scientific data
and understanding, environmentally-oriented legislators may find that they have
expended their energy and influence protecting minimally important natural
resources to the detriment of their ability to address other more weighty problems.
Premature decisions to regulate,just like premature decisions to develop, are socially
suboptimal.
10' Robert B. Koegel, VestingProperty Rights UnderSEQRA, N.Y. LJ.,June 24,1991,
at 18.
"o The Bluegrass Revisited: Regional Strategic Planning for a Vision of the Future
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accelerated development may be very substantial.1 7
Landlines, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLVY,July 1993, at 3. This statement is supported
by 21 telephone interviews, including interviews with representatives of the National
Homebuilders Association, private developers and real estate attorneys, the directors
of two public entities responsible for growth management (the Chesapeake Critical
Areas Commission and the NewJersey Pinelands Commission), and local and state
officials in different regions of the United States. Notes of these interviews are
available from the author.
107 For example, accelerated development reportedly occurred along the South
Carolina Coast in anticipation of the building prohibitions at issue in Lucas.
According to David Lucas, developers "rushed" and "arbitrarily" assembled building
plans and building permit applications in the hope of beating the regulatory clock.
Telephone Interview with David Lucas (Mar. 21,1994) (notes on file with the author).
Another example of a rush to develop is the New Jersey Pinelands. The New
Jersey Pinelands is an area of approximately one million acres in southern NewJersey.
In 1979, the State Legislature established a commission with the mandate to
implement strict growth controls in the Pinelands. Shortly before developmental
restrictions were implemented, there was reportedly a "purposeful" and "extensive"
attempt by developers to expedite projects. Telephone Interview with Terrence
Moore, Chairman, Pinelands Commission (Mar. 22, 1994) (notes on file with the
author);see also W. Patrick Beaton, The Impact of Regional Land-Use Controls on Property
Values: The Case of the New Jersey Pinelands, 67 LAND ECON. 172 (May 1991)
(examining the effects on land values in the Pinelands of "the anticipation of the new
growth controls").
There is also substantial evidence of races to destroy natural habitats in
anticipation of the adoption of habitat preservation restrictions. One of the best-
known cases of such behavior involved Ross Perot. As the New Republic reported:
Perot's land in the Hill Country of west Austin sits at the edge of one
of the nation's most ecologically sensitive areas, the Balcones Canyonlands,
home to ... the golden-checked warbler, a migratory songbird that spends
most of the spring in South America but comes north each year to breed in
the juniper trees of Travis County....
... Perot's company, worried that the golden-checked warbler could
soon be subject to federal protection as an endangered species .. sent in
the bulldozers.
The idea was to clear most of thejuniper trees from Perot's land before
the warblers returned-like razing Capistrano, so that the swallows would
have to swarm somewhere else.
David Wright, Death to Tweety, NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at 9-10; see also Jon H.
Goldstein & H. Theodore Heintz, Jr., Incentivesfor Private Conservation of Species and
Habitat: An Economic Perspective, in A SPECIAL REPORT FROM DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE:
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 51, 53 (1993)
("The restrictions on private land use that result from [the Endangered Species Act]
often reduce the income a landowner can earn from putting his land to other uses.
This creates anti-conservation incentives, with landowners frequently striving to avert
the discovery of a species or its habitat .... "); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act:
Evaluating the Endangered Species Ac Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 45 (1993) (discussing reports of loggers' acceleration of harvesting
in anticipation of preservation restrictions); Wallace Kaufman, The Cost of Saving: You
Take I4 You Payfor It, 99 AM. FORESTS 17 (1993) (discussing landowner's plan to cut
longleaf pines before they become old enough to provide habitat for an endangered
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III. RESPONSES TO THE RACE TO DEVELOP
If one accepts that the race to develop is undesirable and that
its magnitude is substantial enough to warrant concern, the next
logical question becomes, what can be done to prevent it? This Part
explores four possible responses to the race to develop: a legislative
scheme of ex post compensation, ajudicially-enforced constitutional
scheme of ex post compensation, a legislative scheme of ex ante
payments, and a legislative scheme of development taxes.
A. Ex Post Compensation
In theory, a guarantee of ex post compensation could eliminate
the race to develop. If Land Development knew that it would be
compensated for any regulatory losses that might result from
regulations enacted between Year One and Year Four, Land
Development would delay building.
The guarantee of compensation, however, is not costless. For
one thing, that guarantee would result in administrative costs.
Some societal resources would have to be devoted to processing and
evaluating claims for regulatory loss. Administrative costs, in the
aggregate, might be quite large.0 8
Most environmentalists, however, do not criticize ex post
compensation requirements on the basis of administrative costs.
Instead, environmentalists express the concern that compensation
requirements will discourage the enactment of socially beneficial
regulation. In this view, legislative reaction to budgetary expendi-
tures is such that, when confronted with a choice between securing
important but unquantifiable environmental benefits and making a
substantial budgetary outlay, legislators too often will forego
environmental protection. 10 9  One traditional "conservative"
species of woodpecker).
A close analogue to the race to develop is the race to demolish: developers often
demolish buildings before the buildings are designated as historic landmarks. See,
e.g., Thomas Fisher et al., What Price Success-The Role of the Federal Government in
Preservation, 66 PROGRESSIVE ARCHrrECTURE 107, 108-09 (1985) (discussing
developers' circumvention of historic landmark classifications); Eric Nagourney, A
Way of Keeping the Past Alive: Historical Groups Push for Tougher Preservation Law,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 10, 1989, at 34 (describing developers' practice of razing
structures prior to grant of landmark status); Linda Wheeler, 4 Businesses Caught in
Development Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1991, at A18 (providing account of building
razed while historical significance was being debated).
'00 For a discussion of administrative costs, see Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 64,
at 600-01; Michelman, supra note 45, at 1214-18.
109 See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, The "Property Rights" Revolt, NAT'L LJ., May 10,
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response is that forcing costs on-budget does not engender under-
regulation, but rather discourages over-regulation. In this view,
permitting a legislature to regulate without compensation is like
permitting a department store shopper to "buy" goods for free: just
as we would expect the department store shopper to grab goods she
only minimally desires, we would expect the legislature to pass
numerous regulations that generate minimal social benefit. In this
view, shoppers and governments alike should be required to pay for
what they want.n1
This response, however, implicitly accepts the view that
compensation requirements result in less regulation, and that view
is not necessarily correct. For one thing, a guarantee of compensa-
tions has effects in the political marketplace that facilitate regulatory
enactments. The promise of compensation eliminates or at least
reduces the pressure against new regulation that otherwise would be
brought to bear by the potential subjects of regulation."' Land
Development, for example, will not oppose preservation of its
forested land if it is fully compensated against regulatory losses.
The proregulatory effect of removing political opposition must be
balanced against the antiregulatory effect of requiring compensa-
tion.
Moreover, elimination of the race to develop also has a
proregulatory effect that must be balanced against any antireg-
ulatory effect that is introduced by a compensation requirement. In
this regard, consider once again the parcel owned by Land Develop-
ment. The issue is not whether the legislature would be more likely
to take action to preserve the parcel from development in Year Four
if no compensation were required at that time than if compensation
1993, at 1 (discussing the possible antiregulatory effect of state laws requiring the
payment of compensation); Florence Williams, The Compensation Game, WILDERNESS,
Fall 1993, at 29 (same).
"' For a characteristic statement of this view in the popular press, see Michael M.
Berger, Environmental Protection? It Depends on Who Is Paying, L.A. DAILYJ., Aug. 11,
1993, at 7. For more scholarly statements of this view, see generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-61 (4th ed. 1992); William A. Fischel, The
Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 101 (1987); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model
of Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115 (1989); ThomasJ. Miceli &
Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23J. LEG.
STUD. 749 (1994).
1 See Goldstein & Heintz, supra note 107, at 52-53 (arguing that compensation
might quell political opposition to habitat conservation measures); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1958-
59 (1992) (arguing that compensation may reduce opposition to regulation).
1995]
698 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 655
were required at that time. Because a guarantee of compensation
is necessary to prevent the development of the parcel in Year One,
the relevant question is: Which is more likely-that the legislature
will enact uncompensated regulation in Year One or that it will
enact compensated regulation in Year Four? If ecological apprecia-
tion is increasing over time, the latter scenario may be more likely.
And if that is true, a compensation requirement is preferable in
terms of the goal of maximizing preservation.
In balancing the antiregulatory effect of a compensation
requirement against the proregulatory effect of eliminating the race
to develop, moreover, it is important to recall that full compensa-
tion for regulatory losses generally would not be necessary to
eliminate the race to develop. For example, assuming that Land
Development perceives a .2 probability of regulation and is risk
neutral, Land Development presumably would choose the build-in-
Year-Four option so long as it were assured compensation for any
portion of its regulatory losses in the event a building prohibition
is enacted. 112 Under those assumptions, the present value of the
build-in-Year-Four option would exceed the value of the build-in-
Year-One option.
There are two possible legal mechanisms by which ex post
compensation for a regulatory loss could be paid. Such compensa-
tion could be paid by the legislature pursuant to a previous
legislative promise to compensate future regulatory losses ("the
legislative approach"). Alternatively, the legislature's obligation to
pay could be based on the Constitution and hence subject to judicial
enforcement ("thejudicial/constitutional approach"). Because both
approaches present special difficulties, it is not obvious which is
preferable.
The principal obstacle to the legislative approach is the absence
of trust between developers and legislatures. Because of that
112 This example assumes that the regulation would render the property valueless.
As a formal matter, where the perceived probability that compensation for regulatory
losses will be paid is C, the value of the townhomes in Year One is V1, the present
value of the townhomes in Year Four in the event the market for housing strengthens
is PV4, the present value of the townhomes in Year Four in the event the market for
housing remains flat is PV4', the perceived probability that the housing market will
improve is P, the perceived risk that a regulatory prohibition will be enacted between
Year One and Year Four is R, and the present value in Year Four of the land after a
prohibition on construction has been enacted is PV4", Land Development will defer
building if V1 < (1 - R)[(P)(PV4) + (1 - P)(PV4")] + (R)[(i - C)(PV4") + (C)[(P)(PV4)
+ (1 - P)(PV4') - (PV4"))].
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mistrust, a legislative program of ex post compensation might fail to
reduce accelerated development.
Under conditions of complete trust, both developers and
legislators would benefit from an ex post compensation program.
Legislators, representing the general societal or public interest,
would assure less accelerated development and thereby avoid the
social costs that result from it. For their part, developers would
receive a better return on their money if they did not feel com-
pelled to skew the timing of their investments to avoid regulatory
risk.
Game theory, however, suggests that developers and legislators
will be unable to achieve the level of cooperation necessary to
secure the mutual benefits of an ex post compensation program.113
A principal insight of game theory is that cooperation is much
harder to achieve in the context of one-time transactions than in the
context of repeat transactions. In the one-time context, parties have
no historical records upon which to ground their faith in mutual
representations and no way of punishing each other for false
representations once the transaction has been completed. By
contrast, in ongoing relationships, the parties have historical track
records and a much greater capacity to play "tit-for-tat"-to respond
to truthfulness or untruthfulness with like behavior.1 14 Developers
and legislatures often operate in the context of one-time transac-
tions. A single developer may have projects in many jurisdictions,
so that it interacts with many different legislative or regulatory
bodies over time. Moreover, the composition of legislative and
regulatory bodies-as well as the participants in the land develop-
ment market-may change quite quickly. A developer who comes to
an understanding with a group of legislators has no way of knowing
whether those same legislators will be in office after the next
election.
To illustrate how mistrust might undermine a legislative
program of ex post compensation, consider the example of a state
legislature that has promised a group of owners of undeveloped
beachfront property in a remote area that they would be compensat-
ns For a good overview of the modeling of patterns of cooperation and
noncooperation as games, see JOHN EATWELL ET AL., THE NEW PALGRAvE: GAME
THEORY 1-54, 103-08, 178-85, 199-205 (1992).
114 In repeat interaction settings, "it pays not to breach, because the other party
will retaliate; that is, breach back." Robert L. Birmingham, The Duty to Disclose and
the Prisoner's Dilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 249, 278 n.87
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
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ed for losses resulting from any preservation regulation that might
be enacted within the next ten years. The property owners may fear
that the legislature, having prevented accelerated development by
promising compensation, would refuse to pay when it decides to
enact preservation regulation in Year Ten."' The legislature, they
may suspect, will be tempted to have the best of both worlds-the
absence of accelerated development and the absence of compensa-
tion. Anticipating that the legislature will break its promises, the
property owners may accelerate development despite the promise
of ex post compensation.
Frustrated by this response and understandably unwilling to
fund the administration of an ineffectual compensation pro-
gram," 6 the legislature may abandon its compensation guarantee.
The abandonment of the guarantee, in turn, may serve to solidify
developers' doubts about the credibility of legislative promises. The
legislature and developers, in other words, may find themselves
caught in a noncooperative game, the outcome of which is that the
race to develop continues.
Unlike the legislative approach to ex post compensation, the
judicial/constitutional approach probably would not be beset by
problems of "trust." Judicial doctrine is generally not regarded to
be as changeable as legislative sentiment and policy, and, more
fundamentally, judges are unlikely to be perceived as being subject
to the same temptation to retreat from guarantees of compensation.
The judicial approach to ex post compensation, however, also
poses difficulties. First, as discussed above, takings jurisprudence
traditionally has focused upon such questions as whether it is fair to
require a citizen to pay for a public benefit and what constitutes a
"- There is an ample empirical basis for predicting that developers will doubt
government promises. See, e.g., Administration's New Assurance Policy Tells Landowners:
"No Surprises" in Endangered Species Planning, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 11, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Tusnwr file ("A major impediment to property owner
participation in a Habitat Conservation Plan is the fear that, after the costs and
resource restrictions of the plan are accepted, the rules will change and the entire
matter will be reopened.");Jeff Kurowski, Company Expansion Plans Hinge on County
Tax Breaks, S. BEND TRiB.,July 4, 1993, at BI (discussing businessman's doubts that
government officials will honor the promises of tax breaks); Tom Morris, Pine Barrens
Owners Feel "Caught in Bind," NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 29, 1994, at A21 (noting that
"[s]kepticism abounds" concerning a government program that purports to
compensate landowners for regulatory losses by allocating them transferable
development rights).
"' Even a minimally active compensation program will entail some fixed
administration costs.
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benefit rather than a harm. Given this jurisprudential context, it is
very hard to imagine a court explicitly holding that compensation
must be paid under the Fifth Amendment because the absence of
compensation would encourage the socially-costly race to develop.
Second, courts traditionally have taken an all-or-nothing
approach to just compensation. Claimants either are entitled to no
compensation or-if a taking occurred-to full compensation for
their regulatory losses." 7 As discussed above, however, partial
compensation often may be sufficient to eliminate the race to
develop. Payments in excess of the amounts necessary to eliminate
the race to develop may discourage the enactment of regulation
and, even if they have no direct negative effects on legislative or
regulatory behavior, may limit the government's ability to fund
other programs or projects that address important social needs.
These difficulties do not mean that a constitutional compensa-
tion requirement cannot function as an effective response to the
race to develop. Even if courts continue to discuss takings cases
explicitly in terms of public harm and benefit and partial and total
diminution, they may be influenced by litigants' arguments about
accelerated development. Awareness of the problem of accelerated
development, at the very least, may influence scholarly and popular
assessments of takings decisions, and over the long term, courts may
respond to those assessments. 8
Further, a constitutionally based all-or-nothing compensation
regime can function just like a legislatively-based partial compensa-
tion regime in terms of both investor incentives and the aggregate
amount of compensation that must be paid. From the perspective
of a risk-neutral investor, a legislative guarantee of compensation
for one-third of regulatory losses is the equivalent of a one-in-three
"" See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("The
Court ... has employed the concept of fair market value to determine [just
compensation] .... The owner is entitled to receive 'what a willing buyer would pay
in cash to a willing seller' at the time of the taking." (quoting United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943))). For criticisms of the all-or-nothing approach, seeJohnJ.
Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power:. Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1021-23 (1975) (arguing
that the all-or-nothing approach fails to accommodate "the legitimate interests of
government and of private landowners"); Paul, supra note 4, at 1491 (describing the
advantages of "a more flexible view of the appropriate compensation" in takings
cases).
"8 See William W. Fisher, III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings
Doctrine, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1774, 1775-76 (1988) (arguing that courts should
consider popular attitudes in deciding takings cases).
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chance of obtaining full compensation in a constitutionally based
court challenge. If, for example, a legislative guarantee to pay one-
third of regulatory losses is sufficient to convince the investor not
to accelerate development, then the one-third chance of obtaining
a judicial award of full compensation also should be sufficient." 9
Moreover, assuming that judicial willingness to find a taking does
not correlate directly or inversely with the absolute magnitude of
the regulatory losses claimed in each case, the aggregate amount of
compensation paid under the judicial/constitutional approach
should be the same as it is under the legislative approach.
It is possible that our current takings jurisprudence operates in
just this fashion. The Lucas plurality opinion did not explicitly
overrule Keystone and other cases suggesting that losses resulting
from preservation regulation are always noncompensable. Although
the opinion states that total diminutions of value generally will
trigger a requirement of full compensation, it leaves substantial
uncertainty as to both the meaning of total diminution in value and
the latitude of state courts to characterize their common law of
property as categorizing the destruction of nature as a public
nuisance. Operating in the highly uncertain world of post-Lucas
takings jurisprudence, a property owner like Land Development
might rightly guess that there is only a one-in-three chance it would
receive a court award of compensation in the event of a stringent
developmental ban. That estimate, however, might well prevent it
from accelerating development.
19 For example, in the Land Development example, see supra notes 90-104 and
accompanying text, assume that the current value of development of Land
Development's parcel is $1,500,000 and its present value in Year Four, absent
regulation, is $3,000,000. Assume also that regulation in Year Four would render the
parcel valueless, and Land Development perceives a .7 risk of regulation. The present
value of the build-in-Year-Four option, factoring in the risk of uncompensated
regulation, is (.3)($3,000,000), or $900,000. In the absence of any prospect of
compensation, therefore, Land Development will build in Year One.
Now assume that the legislature makes a credible promise that it will compensate
Land Development for up to one-third of its regulatory losses in Year Four. The
present value of the build-in-Year-Four option then would be $900,000 plus (.7)(.33)
($3,000,000), or $1,600,000. If there is no legislative promise of compensation, but
Land Development perceives a .33 chance of obtaining a judicial award of full
compensation for any regulatory losses incurred in Year Four, the present value of
the build-in-Year-Four option also would be $900,000 plus (.7)(.33)($3,000,000), or
$1,600,000. Because the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option exceeds the
current value of development under both the legislative and judicial/constitutional
compensation approaches, Land Development would not accelerate development
under either approach.
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This analysis, of course, does not prove that either a legislative
or judicial/constitutional compensation requirement will result in
more preservation in aggregate than the complete absence of such
a requirement. For those who remain concerned about the undeni-
able possibility that any form of compensation solution to the race
to develop will result in less preservation, an ex ante approach to the
race to develop may hold more appeal.
B. Ex Ante Payments
As an alternative to addressing the problem of the race to
develop by means of a guarantee of ex post compensation, one could
structure a legislative ex ante payment program that would achieve
the same result. Ex ante payments could compensate property
owners for retaining their land in its natural state and hence bearing
the risk of future uncompensated preservation regulation.
To illustrate how such ex ante payments would work, let us
return once again to the Land Development example. Let us
assume that the risk of uncompensated regulation is .3. Under
these assumptions, Land Development would choose to build in
Year One because the value of the Year-One option ($2,000,000)
exceeds the present value of the Year-Four option ($1,750,000).120
Now imagine that the government gives Land Development
$300,000 in Year One on the condition that Land Development
agrees not to develop the land between Year One and Year Four.
The present value of the Year-Four option ($2,050,000) then would
exceed the value of the Year-One option ($2,000,000). As a result
of the ex ante payment, Land Development presumably would
choose not to accelerate development.
The ex ante payment approach has some disadvantages in com-
parison to an ex post guarantee of compensation. For one thing, the
ex ante approach may require payment in more cases and thus entail
greater administrative and payment costs. Under an ex ante ap-
proach, payment must be made regardless of whether a decision to
regulate is ever made; the ex post approach focuses on the (presum-
"These figures are again based on the assumptions that Land Development
perceives a .5 probability that the economy will improve and a .5 probability that the
economy will remain flat. The value of the development currently is $2,000,000, its
present value in an unimproved economy in Year Four is $2,000,000, and its present
value in an improved economy in Year Four is $3,000,000. When the risk of
regulation is .3, the present value of the build-in-Year-Four option is (1 - .3)
[(.5)($2,000,000) + (1 - .5)($3,000,000)] + (.3)(0).
1995]
704 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 655
ably) more limited set of cases in which regulations actually are
enacted.
Moreover, an ex post approach is more effective than an ex ante
approach in reducing or eliminating antiregulatory pressure from
potential subjects of regulation. To illustrate this point, assume that
Land Development would forego accelerated development if it were
given an ex ante payment of $500,000 or promised $500,000 in ex
post compensation for regulatory losses. Land Development would
receive the $500,000 ex ante payment whether or not regulation is
enacted, but it would receive the $500,000 expost payment only after
the passage of regulation. The defeat of preservation regulation,
therefore, would be worth $500,000 more to Land Development
under an ex ante approach than under an ex post approach.
Consequently, Land Development would lobby more intensely
against proposed regulation under an ex ante approach than it would
under an ex post approach.
12 1
Another disadvantage of ex ante payments is the risk of "capture"
of the legislature by payment recipients. One possible consequence
of any government payment program is the creation of a powerful
political constituency for the continuation of the program: once
landowners begin to receive payments for maintaining land in an
undeveloped state, they may organize and lobby effectively for the
continuation of the payments. Thus, even if it becomes apparent
that payments are unnecessary to prevent accelerated development,
legislators may respond to payment recipients' entreaties and
continue the payment program.
22
12' A legislative program of ex ante payments could be structured to avoid the
"trust" problems that may beset a legislative program of ex post compensation.
Developers could be given payments at the beginning of the time period in question
with the proviso that, if they develop during that period, the money would have to
be refunded with interest. Noncompliance by developers could be checked by levies
on their property and fines.
122 There are, of course, many examples of government payment programs that
seem to have outlived the original reason for their establishment. For example,
although the protection of small family farms from financial ruin was the original
rationale for federal farm subsidy programs, "such farmers are not in fact the primary
beneficiaries of[the subsidies]. A disproportionate amount of federal subsidies goes
to large, wealthy farmers." Dick Armey, I Love the Family Farmer, but.... WASH.
POST, July 24, 1993, at A23; see also Steve Berg, City Folks' Tough Questions Shake up
Farm Debate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 6, 1990, at IA (discussing criticisms of
farm subsidies).
The enabling legislation for a payment program might mitigate the risk of
legislative capture by requiring periodic assessments of the payment program by a
relatively neutral expert agency, such as the Government Accounting Office. Alterna-
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An ex ante payment system also entails difficulties in determining
who should make payment. To the extent that the risk of uncom-
pensated natural preservation regulation emanates from federal,
state, and local government, it would seem that the burden of
payment should be shared by all three. If past experience in other
contexts is any guide, implementation of that sharing arrangement
might well be difficult. In other "sharing" contexts, the federal
government has attempted to foist financial responsibility on the
states, who in turn have attempted to shift the burden to munici-
palities. Municipalities will reject any ex ante scheme that assigns
them disproportionate financial responsibility.
1 23
From the perspective of the goal of maximizing preservation
efforts, the principal advantage of an ex ante approach is that it
decouples the payment to the property owners from the legislative
decision whether to subject their land to preservation regulation.
To the extent one believes that the race to develop may be a serious
problem and that a compensation requirement may deter legisla-
tors from enacting socially beneficial preservation regulation, the
ex ante approach is attractive; it addresses the race to develop
without attaching any budgetary cost to the enactment of such
regulation.
Moreover, the ex ante approach might create an affirmative
incentive to regulate that would offset the antiregulatory pressure
that landowners like Land Development would continue to exert.
In classical economic theory, "sunk" or past costs are assumed to be
irrelevant to any "rational" decision about future action; the only
relevant data considered should be the marginal costs and benefits
of the contemplated future action. As an abundance of experiments
by clinical psychologists demonstrate, human beings, in fact, tend
to weigh past costs heavily in prospective decision-making.124 An ex
tively, the legislation might provide that the program terminates automatically after
a short period of time unless the legislature votes to reauthorize it.
" See e.g., Environmental Conservation Organization, ECO, Announces Grassroots
Campaign to Stop Unfunded Mandates, PR Newswire, Feb. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, PRNews File ("'Unfunded Mandates' are fighting words in many cities
and counties across America. The U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League
of Cities, [and] the National Association of Counties... have waged a strong battle
to gain congressional recognition of the problems created in local communities by
unfunded mandates."); Matt Lait & Lee Romney, O.C. Cities Balk at Costs of U.S., State
Mandates, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at Al (noting that "local government leaders
complain that federal and state governments continue to pass new laws-then pass the
tab onto the cities").
... See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theoiy of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
19951
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ex ante scheme in effect creates a sunk costs argument in favor of
preservation. Having spent money to preserve the regulatory option
in the form of ex ante payments, legislators may regard it as wasteful
not to exercise that option.
C. Development Taxes
One alternative to ex ante subsidies is time-limited development
taxes. Such taxes, in theory, could achieve the same result as ex ante
payments. To illustrate how a development tax would address the
problem of accelerated development, return to Land Development's
choice between Year One and Year Four. Assume that, as a result
of the risk of uncompensated regulation, the build-in-Year-One
option has a value $50,000 in excess of the present value of the
build-in-Year-Four option. Under these assumptions, Land Devel-
opment would accelerate development. Now assume that, in Year
One, the legislature passes a development tax bill that provides that,
if Land Development develops its land prior to Year Four, it will be
subject to a $75,000 special development tax. Under these assump-
tions, Land Development will choose to build in Year Four despite
the risk of uncompensated natural preservation regulation.
Of course, a development tax solution to the race to develop,
like the legislative ex post compensation solution, presupposes a
certain level of trust between the legislature and developers. Absent
some trust relationship between the legislature and a developer, it
may be extremely difficult to convince the developer that it is
prudent to wait based on a promise about future tax treatment and,
as discussed above, there is good reason to doubt the prospects for
the establishment of such a relationship of trust.
1 25
Moreover, because development taxes are extremely unattractive
to property owners such as Land Development, they may be
politically impossible to enact in the first place. There may be many
jurisdictions in which the only politically viable response to the race
to develop entails ex post or ex ante payments.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39 (1980) (noting that "paying for the right to use a good
or service will increase the rate at which the good will be utilised" even though
"[h]istorical costs should be irrelevant" to consumers); see also RICHARD H. THALER,
QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 148-49 (1991).
" See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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D. The Dimensions of the Response to the Race to Develop
Under any of the approaches outlined above, there will be
difficult questions of measurement. In theory, we can estimate how
much, for example, Land Development must be paid or taxed in
order to prevent it from accelerating development. In practice, that
figure will be difficult to estimate and, even if we knew the amount
with certainty at one point in time, the amount might change a
great deal over time. And the necessary amount would vary
enormously among different property owners and in different
settings. The best we can probably achieve in practice is a system
of periodically-adjusted rates of ex ante or ex post payment or tax for
relatively broad geographical areas or kinds of natural resources.
Recognition of this difficulty leads me to conclude that,
whatever the form of any response to the race to develop, its
dimensions should be modest. As a matter of prudence and
political viability, it makes sense to proceed cautiously and with the
understanding that any given level of payment or tax will fail to
prevent accelerated development in some cases and will provide or
(in the case of taxes) take away from some property owners more
than was necessary to prevent them from engaging in accelerated
development in other cases. For example, assuming that the ex ante
payment approach is the most desirable and politically feasible
response to the race to develop, it may be that all that is appropri-
ate is a quite modest tax break for individuals and companies that
hold undeveloped land of well-established ecological value in
geographic areas that are recognized to be under substantial long-
term developmental pressure.
126
126 Preferential tax treatment for open land already exists in some states, although
the state programs have not been justified in terms of the social costs of accelerated
development undertaken in response to the risk of uncompensated regulation. See
Jane H. Malme, Preferential Assessment: Policy & Practice in New England, RESOURCE
MANUAL: PREFERENTIAL PROPERTY TAX TREATMENT OF FOREST AND OPEN SPACE
LAND IN NEW ENGLAND (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass.), 1993, at 1,
8-10.
In order to meet the "compelling" need for "economic incentives to motivate
private parties to conserve important habitat on private land,"Jim McKinney, Mark
Shaffer, and Jeffrey Olsen of the Wilderness Society have advocated a number of
changes in federal, state, and local taxation, including property tax credits for habitat
maintenance, tax credits for habitat improvement, income tax deductions for revenue
from lands that support endangered species, tax penalties for habitat conversion, and
prohibitions on the use of federal subsidies and tax benefits for activities causing
habitat loss or degradation. Jim McKinney et al., Economic Incentives to Preserve
Endangered Species Habitat and Biodiversity on Private Land, in DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
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CONCLUSION
The nonretroactivity of preservation regulation has a conse-
quence that has long gone unexamined: it encourages races to beat
the regulatory clock. In the course of that race, developers divert
capital from higher-return investments and-where they are
successful in winning the race-deprive society of an option to
regulate in the future. Although compensation for regulatory losses
traditionally has been regarded as an impediment to the project of
preserving our natural resources, it can be seen as facilitating that
project inasmuch as it would reduce or eliminate the race to
develop. Of course, compensation proposals, like development tax
proposals, present many difficulties. The question this Article has
explored is whether the costs of accelerated development might
outweigh the costs of the various possible responses to it. For
anyone concerned about the preservation of our natural resources,
that is a question demanding serious consideration.
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1, 5-7, 9-13
(Wendy E. Hudson ed. 1993) (describing implementation mechanisms for these tax
incentives).
